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JSOU Report 06-6

One Valley at a Time

Adrian T. Bogart III

Joint Special Operations University

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Adrian T. Bogart III

with Introduction by Walter M. Herd



JSOU Report 06-6
August 2006



Joint Special Operations University and the Strategic Studies Department

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at a Time*

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The 2004 counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan was historic. Service personnel of general purpose, special operations, coalition, and irregular forces worked in unison to defeat the insurgency in a country stricken by war. Their unwavering trust, cooperation, close integration, collaborative planning, and nested execution were in many cases, textbook. In recognition of their professional effort, this case study captures many of the lessons learned in their planning and operations. Success in Afghanistan also came from the determination of millions of Afghans who were supported by these gallant sailors, soldiers, marines, and airmen.

To Major Cole Hogan, U.S. Army Special Forces; battalion chief Jack Fanning; Fire Department of New York; and all our fellow warriors whose selfless service gained victory in Afghanistan.

“One Team”¹

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Foreword

Lieutenant Colonel Bogart, with the help of other Army Special Forces members, has authored an insightful monograph about conducting a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Afghanistan. Through the operational lens of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in their 2004 campaign against the Taliban and their Al Qaeda supporters, “One Valley” details the accomplishments of Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) 76. Bogart’s work shares the experiences and perspectives of SOF planners as they developed their COIN strategy and organized to conduct the campaign.

This planners’ viewpoint—a slice of perspective in the ongoing Long War—provides valuable insight. This work describes the operational and tactical successes of brave SOF warriors working with their Afghan and other coalition partners. With the advantage of hindsight, one hopes the work of CJSOTF-A 76 will stand the test of time as the recent resurgence of Taliban operations in the summer of 2006 indicates clearly the need to continue the fight.

LTC Bogart’s work is extremely valuable. “One Valley” enumerates the thought processes and the challenges for conducting a COIN campaign in Afghanistan. As Lieutenant General David Barno wrote in his summer 2006 Parameters article, “The Taliban often reminded villagers: ‘The Americans may have all the wristwatches, we have all the time.’” The Taliban and LTC Bogart have arrived at the same conclusion—the Afghan people are the ultimate decision makers in the conflict. Whomever they choose to support and follow will rule Afghanistan. While it is not possible to defeat an insurgency in a year’s time, this monograph demonstrates that we can establish an operational foundation upon which to achieve strategic victory.

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Adrian Bogart is a Special Forces (SF) officer who has served in U.S. Army, joint, and combined command and



staff assignments with special operations and general purpose forces. He started as an infantry officer serving in a mechanized infantry battalion in Germany, transferring over to SF thereafter with assignments as a SF detachment commander, SF company executive officer, and SF company commander. He served as a SF staff officer on the Army Staff and was one of the found-

ers of the Department of Defense domestic consequence management capability, building the Civil Support teams and establishing the United States (U.S.) Northern Command.

After his assignments in the Pentagon, LTC Bogart was the deputy C9 chief of operations for the Combined Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC), Operation Iraqi Freedom in Kuwait and Iraq (2002 and 2003), later moving to 3d SF Group where he served as the J5 and chief of staff/executive officer for the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), Operation Enduring Freedom (2003 and 2004). LTC Bogart currently serves as the G9 of the 4th Infantry Division deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07, responsible for Special Operations Forces (SOF) integration, counterinsurgency, and civil affairs. He is a graduate of Virginia Military Institute (civil engineering), U.S. Army Command and Staff College, Army Force Management School, and Defense Strategy Course.

Acknowledgements

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The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 76 campaign in Afghanistan led to successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations under the leadership of Major General Eric T. Olson, Brigadier General Charles H. Jacoby Jr., and Brigadier General Bernard S. Champoux. Colonel Herd and Colonel Higgins were the two Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) commanders who directed the special operations supporting plan to the CJTF-A campaign plan for COIN operations in the Afghanistan theater of operations. The foundation of the COIN campaign strategy was developed in a 1.5-day March 2004 commander's planning conference. The guidance from the previous commander, Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, was the basis for this victory, and his views on COIN can be found in the JSOU publication *Operationalizing COIN*, September 2005.

A large number of junior leaders who were responsible for the operational functions of the campaign—for example, planning, operations, psychological operations, civil affairs, logistics, and communications—deserve great credit for their technical expertise, timely decisions, and dedication to the mission and as fighting comrades. They are not mentioned by name here as some have returned to the battlefield to continue the fight.

Photographs used by permission from Steve Herbert
and CJSOTF-A members.



Afghanistan

1. Introduction

"I want you to move into that province, oust the Al Qaeda, co-opt the locals, and bring security to the region. Take as many Afghan forces as you can muster and be ready to move as soon as you can. What are your questions?" Those were basically the orders I gave the Special Forces A-Team commander as he moved into the Lwara District in Afghanistan. In short, I tasked him to conduct *unconventional warfare* in that region by fighting the terrorists by, with, and through the indigenous forces rather than by using primarily U.S. military might.

— Colonel Walter M. Herd, commander, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), 2004

In *One Valley at a Time*, Lieutenant Colonel Adrian Bogart provides the reader with a case study of how one group of Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted their form of unconventional warfare in the 2004 timeframe. It recognized the uniqueness of the situation in Afghanistan, while drawing upon historical examples for designing an unconventional warfare campaign. As commander of the CJSOTF-A for almost a year, it is my good fortune to introduce LTC Bogart's story. *One Valley* draws from the successes and sacrifices of the Task Force troops to tell a story of our campaign in Afghanistan, and I am pleased to offer my thoughts here about operational leadership in an unconventional warfare environment.

While I argue that unconventional warfare (UW) is the primary means for winning our current war on terror and that all other military efforts can support this primary UW focus, the definition of UW is unclear in the minds of many. Most of the professional soldiers, military academics, historians, and armchair generals would agree that UW is an ambiguous and broad type of warfare that the American military has seldom executed on a large scale.

When defining UW, most professional soldiers and military academics would quote Joint Publication 1-02:

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominately conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by

an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations as well as the indirect activation of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW.

These military students would break down the specific caveats listed and create a checklist of operations that fall into the category of “UW.” Many would then argue, wrongly, that this type of warfare is at best only a supporting effort to the decisive blow provided by large-scale maneuver forces or, even worse, that UW is an unrealistic option in future war. In contrast, historians studying UW would focus on the days of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG) or the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II. They would discuss the crucial ability of these UW operators to mingle with the local forces in order to gain both popular support and ground truth intelligence.

I have a very direct and personal view of UW, based largely on my command experiences in Afghanistan. While the study of joint publications, Army manuals, and American military history is certainly worthwhile, I believe the crux of what we need to know about UW can be found in a book we all read back in the 8th grade—Mark Twain’s *Tom Sawyer*. Early in that book, as you may recall, Tom was tasked to whitewash a fence in front of his aunt’s home. In order to accomplish this task, Tom co-opted his friends and neighborhood pals to paint the fence for him. He painted just enough himself to inspire and instruct his surrogates. In the end, the fence got painted, the whole community had bought into the project, and Tom did not get paint splashed all over himself.

It is often thought (wrongly) that UW is just training and combat-advising indigenous forces on the battlefield. In fact, that is only a part of UW, certainly not the whole. If you are operating *by*, *with*, and *through* indigenous people, you are conducting UW. If you are fighting *by*, *with*, and *through* or collecting intelligence and conducting operational preparation of the environment *by*, *with*, and *through* others, you are conducting UW.

Whether the job is direct action, special reconnaissance, or sabotage and subversion, if the focus is on doing it *by*, *with*, and *through* the indigenous population, consider it UW. In an unconventional war

the default force of choice should always be the indigenous force. Unilateral force is only used as a last resort. Even if tactically successful, a unilateral operation may ultimately lead to failure by unseating the very indigenous capability you are trying to build.

What does this academic discussion have to do with the ongoing war? The first thing leaders must do in any situation is to grasp and define the problem. *This* problem—the war on terror—has *unconventional* aspects to its nature. It is a war that is best fought using the indirect approach. The hard cold facts are that if we, the U.S. military, try too hard to win this war single-handedly, we'll lose it. The only way to win our current war is *by, with, and through* others. The very definition of victory in this war is when *others*, other nations and other cultures, police their societies properly so that those same societies aren't terrorist-breeding grounds or safe havens from which terrorists can attack our homeland again. That alone dictates that this war is not a traditional maneuver war, but a global unconventional war. This type of unconventional war requires an unconventional strategic concept combined with strategic patience (perseverance) by the American government as well as its people. There is no Blitzkrieg in UW; only a long-term approach will help deliver victory.

Some armchair generals, legacy-thinking academics, and poorly informed professionals may say that we will not conduct UW in modern times. They think that if you don't parachute into occupied territory, link up with a partisan group, and overthrow an occupying army like the OSS did six decades ago, it is not UW. In fact, we are conducting UW every day in this war. We have over a dozen Special Forces (SF) A-camps in Afghanistan alone tasked to do UW. The vast majority of the actionable and reliable intelligence we have in that region comes from SF troopers working *by, with, and through* others. In more cases than not, it is the



Figure 1. CJSOTF-A motto: “by, with, and through” others.

SF-recruited, trained, and advised Afghan Security apparatus that is providing security, not the coalition forces.

An illustrative example of our UW concept is the operations conducted in the Lwara Province of Afghanistan. The CJSOTF-A tasked an SF Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) commander to build an A-camp and conduct UW *by, with, and through* the indigenous population. He took his A-team in consort with one company of Afghan National Army soldiers and their old Soviet 82-mm mortars, about a dozen Afghan border guards, and an equal number of Afghan custom police. Within 1 week of their arrival, after preempting several enemy attacks, this small UW force had denied that area as a safe haven for the enemy. A few months later, a small investment of only their time, expertise, and about \$50,000 resulted in the area participating in the national elections and moving down the road to stability. We are enjoying success in countless other dusty valleys in the region by operating *by, with, and through* the indigenous peoples.

Another great example of unconventional *by, with, and through* operations was in southern Afghanistan when one of our indigenous forces brought us nearly 20 Taliban insurgents. Over about a 2-month period, he literally bound and gagged these terrorists and delivered them to one of our A-camps in the back of his Toyota station wagon. By following this *Tom Sawyer* example, American SF working *by, with, and through* both indigenous individuals and indigenous military units were able to change the environmental conditions and thus deny sanctuary to any leftover guerrillas. One valley at a time, stability can spread. This persistent spreading of influence into formally controlled Taliban areas, one valley at a time, is achieved by a UW strategy.

We used the combination of *strike* operations and *civic action* with great success by following one simple rule: co-opt those that you can, then destroy the rest. The sequence counts. While not the focus of the conventional military, the key to this kind of war is to attack the enemy's popular support as well as his combat forces. In order to do that, we must separate the guerrilla from his support base (auxiliary and underground). This must be done kinetically, fiscally, physically, socially, or even emotionally. When we introduce security to most of the local inhabitants, they eventually buy into the overall plan. Thus the insurgent is left alone in the cold (literally). His choices are only to fight or convert. Co-opt as many as possible

by introducing a better option, and then you are left with only the *unredeemable* to fight. It is a simple truth with insurgencies: *contented people don't revolt*. So we must attack the source of the anger, the causes of the instability, with the same vigor that we attack the armed insurgent.

Some may think that any quality unit can remake themselves into UW experts. Our nation has a large kitbag full of organizations with different capabilities and cultures. Most of those capabilities in the conventional forces as well as most of the special operations units are strike-focused. Each force package can bring different capabilities to the fight. Only SF soldiers are recruited, assessed, trained, equipped, and organized primarily to fight the UW mission—*by, with, and through* others. They have been specifically bred to operate in this ambiguous and unconventional

Only SF soldiers are recruited, assessed, trained, equipped, and organized primarily to fight the UW mission—by, with, and through others.

environment. Per capita, these unconventional warriors are disproportionately responsible for the overthrow of the Taliban and the continued counterinsurgency (COIN) successes in Afghanistan. In Iraq, it was the unconventional warriors of 10th and 5th SF Groups that marginalized over a dozen Iraqi mechanized divisions and thus controlled the northern and western portions (approximately two thirds) of the nation.

America has transformed the SF units at the tactical level to the most effective UW force on earth. A question for further study is how can we continue to transform at the strategic level: *who is fighting the strategic unconventional war?* Clearly, our way of life is at stake. We are currently fighting a global unconventional war on terror. Victory in this UW war is defined when others are capable and motivated to secure their own lands from becoming a terrorist sanctuary. As such, our main effort must focus on facilitating *by, with, and through* success. The focus of the bombers, the tankers, and the commandos is to ultimately support those fighting this global war *by, with, and through* indigenous peoples. If we do it alone now, we'll be doing it alone forever.

One Valley at a Time advises the reader how UW can be successfully conducted. While it is a case study about a specific location in a time now past, I believe it offers strategic insight and counsel for

those who will continue in the future to advance the causes of liberty and justice—and live up to the SF’s motto, *de oppresso liber* (“to free the oppressed”).

Walter M. Herd
Colonel, U.S. Army SF

Figure 2.
Face to face with
Afghan, Pakistan,
and American
leaders to discuss
border security,
9 March 2004.



2. The True Believer, the Enemy At Large

Somewhere a *true believer* is training to kill you. He is training with minimum food or water, in austere conditions, day and night. The only thing clean on him is his weapon. He doesn't worry about what workout to do; his rucksack weighs what it weighs, and he runs until the enemy stops chasing him. The true believer doesn't care "how hard it is"; he knows he either wins or he dies. He doesn't go home at 1700; he is home. He knows only the *cause*. Now, who wants to quit?

— Unknown source, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

The true believer is a father, a brother, a nephew, a cousin, or a son who has become the revolutionary, the emir, the foot soldier in the war against the U.S. and the West. The true believer is at war with what the U.S. stands for in the world. His blackened eyes are consumed with hate. He is undaunted in his cause. His terms are unconditional, and he does not seek parley. The true believer is acknowledged to be radical Islamic fundamentalists generally organized, supported, or aligned with the Al Qaeda network.² The true believer is who we fought in Afghanistan.

Al Qaeda Goals, Motivations, and Objectives

Al Qaeda goals, motivations, and objectives are straightforward and very much advertised through the teaching of their leaders. They are clearly detailed in the U.S. Federal Grand Jury indictment against Osama bin Laden issued in New York on 5 November 1994 for the East Africa bombings.³ The indictment states that Al Qaeda went to war against the U.S. for several reasons. The organization views the U.S. as an "infidel" because it was not governed in a manner consistent with the group's extremist interpretation of Islam. The U.S. is also viewed as providing essential support for other "infidel" governments and institutions, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the nation of Israel, and the United Nations organization, which were regarded as enemies of the group.

The indictment went on to state that Al Qaeda opposed the involvement of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Gulf War in 1991 and in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992 and 1993, which were viewed by Al Qaeda as pretextual preparations for an American occupation of Islamic countries. In particular, Al Qaeda opposed the continued presence of American military forces in Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the Saudi Arabian peninsula) following the Gulf War. Of course today we see Al Qaeda conducting active combat operations against the U.S. and the coalition and allied partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, perhaps in the Philippines, and of course targeting the U.S. mainland.

The Grand Jury indictment further stated that one of the principal goals of Al Qaeda is to drive the U.S. military out of Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere in the Middle East) through violence.

Al Qaeda builds on its perceived success in forcing Russia out of Afghanistan, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, and defeating the U.S. in Somalia.

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Members of Al Qaeda issued fatwahs (rulings on Islamic law) indicating that such attacks were both proper and necessary. From 1993 until December 1999, Ayman Al Zawahiri led the Egyptian Islamic *jihād* (“holy war”), which was dedicated to the forceful overthrow of the Egyptian government and to violent opposition of the U.S., in part, for its support of the government in Egypt.

The Al Qaeda Operation

Al Qaeda operates around a core nucleus of individuals who lead a series of operations, logistics, finance, training, and command cells populated by surrogates and line or foot soldiers. Al Qaeda is distinguished from other terrorist organizations due to its non-state status, transnational reach, and unconstrained “military” operations against the U.S. Al Qaeda is the principal external sponsor supporting internal insurgencies throughout the world. Understanding Al Qaeda is key to understanding how it supported the Afghan insurgency.

Organization and Infrastructure. Al Qaeda functions both on its own and through some of the terrorist organizations that operate in areas such as the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, the Kashmir region of India, and the Chechnya region of Russia. Al Qaeda maintains cells and personnel in a number of countries to facilitate its activities, including in Kenya, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the U.S.

Command Structure. Al Qaeda's command and control structure includes a Majlis al Shura (or consultation council), which approves major undertakings including terrorist operations, a "military committee" that considers and approves "military" matters, and alliances with the national Islamic front in the Sudan, representatives of the Government of Iran, and its associated terrorist group Hizballah.

Support Activities. In 1994, Al Qaeda established a media information office in London, England to provide a cover for activity in support of Al Qaeda's "military" activities, including the recruitment of military trainees, disbursement of funds, equipment procurement, and conduit for messages.

Training Base. The organization had provisioned guest houses and training camps at various times (from at least as early as 1989) and areas, including Afghanistan, United Kingdom, Pakistan, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, and the Philippines.

Financial and Business Dealings. Since 1989, Al Qaeda has been engaged in financial and business transactions, including purchasing land for training camps; purchasing warehouses for storage of items, including explosives; purchasing communications and electronics equipment; transferring funds between corporate accounts; and transporting currency and weapons to members of Al Qaeda and its associated terrorist organizations in various countries throughout the world. To carry out some of these transactions, Al Qaeda operates in Malaysia, China, the Philippines, and Germany.

History of the Organization and the Road to War

The Al Qaeda “base” was developed by bin Laden and others in the early 1980s to support the war effort in Afghanistan against the Soviets. He established a recruiting and charity drive to support the Mujahedin fighters in Afghanistan. The resulting “victory” in Afghanistan gave rise to the overall jihad movement. Trained Mujahedin fighters from Afghanistan began returning to such countries as Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia with extensive jihad experience and the desire to continue the jihad. This antagonism began to be refocused against the U.S. and its allies.⁴

From 1989 until the present, Al Qaeda serves as an international terrorist group dedicated to opposing non-Islamic governments with force and violence. This organization grew out of the *mekhtab al khidemat* (the “services office”) organization, which had maintained offices in various parts of the world, including Afghanistan, Pakistan (particularly in Peshawar), and the U.S., particularly at the Alkifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn, New York.

In 1989 the group began to call itself *Al Qaeda* and headquartered in Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan. In 1991 the leadership of Al Qaeda, including its *emir* (prince) bin Laden, relocated to the Sudan. Al Qaeda was headquartered in the Sudan from approximately 1991 to 1996 but still maintained offices in various parts of the world. In 1996 bin Laden, Muhammad Atef, and other members of Al Qaeda relocated to Afghanistan.

In an address to Congress on 7 February 2001, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director George Tenet identified bin Laden as one of the leading threats to U.S. national security.

Bin Laden and his organization have been actively opposing the U.S. in a series of “battles” and “campaigns” to achieve their goals and objectives. The Al Qaeda has an extensive worldwide network, which has demonstrated agility in striking U.S. targets both domestically and abroad. Al Qaeda represents the most sophisticated terrorist threat against the U.S.⁵

Activities connected to bin Laden and the Al Qaeda are outlined in the following table.

Year	Activity
1993	Mogadishu ambush of U.S. Army forces
	World Trade Center bombing in Lower Manhattan, New York
1995	Manila Air bombing, (test for 11 U.S. Flag Carriers over the Pacific)
1996	Khobar Tower bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
	Bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya
	Bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
1999	Failed attack of Los Angeles International Airport
2000	Seaborne attack against the USS <i>Cole</i> , in Aden, Yemen
2001	Coordinated attack against New York and Washington D.C.
	Fronts of resistance established in Afghanistan
2003	Fronts of resistance established in Iraq
	Fronts of resistance established in Europe (Madrid and Russia)
2004	Fronts of resistance established in Sudan and Central Africa
2005	Fronts of Resistance established in Australia? Lebanon?

Al Qaeda's alliance with the Taliban and the state support provided to Al Qaeda brought the U.S. to war in Afghanistan, commencing combat operations on October 2001. To prosecute our part of the war, the leaders of CJSOTF-A considered three essential concepts, or tenets of our COIN efforts, that guided planning. These involved considering the land, the mindset of the people, and the problem of outside support. The next section discusses these issues and their relationship to the nature of the enemy as we found it—the guerilla, the underground, and the auxiliary.




Figure 3. Afghan civil leader, 22 October 2004—the operational center of gravity.

3. Tenets of War in Afghanistan and the Afghan Resistance

Afghanistan is a pastoral landscape. Except for the slight marks of the 21st century, the grazing livestock, mud-walled villages, and dress of the men, women, and children seem closer to the time of Mohammed than the world the western observer knows today.

Afghans are purely tribal people whose societal foundation encompasses the nuclear, immediate, and greater family. They are tied to their land, which by western standards is bleak, barren, and desolate, but to the Afghan is their heaven on earth. Afghans are a mountainous people who are bound by the influences of nature and their surroundings. In this harsh land, life is a struggle, and their struggle is their religion.

Their reverent belief in God is stalwart because as an agrarian culture, they are victims to nature. If there is a drought, it is God's will. If there is a famine, God has made it so. If their crops are bountiful, God has blessed the season. An agrarian society embraces religion, more so than an industrial society who to a greater degree manipulates nature and the environment more than the rural society is capable of doing.

I am a Pashtun for 5,000 years, I am a Muslim for 1,400 years,
I am a Pakistani for 40 years.

— Pashtun politician in Pakistan

The majority population of Afghanistan consists of the Pashtuns. Tribal and family identities are strong and well represented in this group. Their tribal culture and unwritten laws, which comprises the geographic area they dominate—Pashtunwali, reveal a strong set of traditions that are meant to maintain and repair relationships between families, tribes, and clans through extension of blood relations (intermarriages) and a systematic way of resolving disputes between these groups. In addition to the Pashtun-dominated area, Pashtunistan, that stretches across the international border, there is an officially recognized “Pashtunistan Day” celebrated annually on 19 August.⁶

The Pashtun are not at peace unless they are at war.

— Pashtun proverb

Pashtuns, as a tribe, have been a dominant force in this region for 5,000 years, and the Taliban movement has its base and only stronghold among the Pashtun. The Taliban movement has its roots in *Deobandism*, which originated in northern India under the British and in the Pashtun-Islamic culture of this region. However, the Taliban's fundamentalist-militant ideology is more common in the Muslim world than many people (especially westerners) realize. For example, the Taliban is of the Wahhabi sect of Islam, which is the same sect of Islam widely practiced in Saudi Arabia. In most parts of Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabi religious police (Al-Mutawwayeen) strictly enforce *Sharia* (a body of Islamic law), to include the following:

- a. Preventing the building of churches or any religious structure other than a mosque
- b. Arresting people who practice any religion other than Islam
- c. Beating women who are not covered properly or attempt to protest injustices
- d. Forcing businesses to close during prayer time
- e. Enforcing harsh penalties for the violations of certain Islamic laws.

This type of fundamentalist enforcement also occurs in many other countries and areas in the Islamic world.

The Land

The first tenet in understanding waging war in Afghanistan is that the Afghan people are knitted to their land. The greater family, their beliefs in God, the agrarian nature of their existence, the harshness of the climate, and their isolation bind them to it rather than tie them to an industrial society. The impassable mountains and rugged plains, which envelope this country, makes Afghanistan a pastoral watercolor whose very nature defies modernization.

It is here, in this context, where the first part of our understanding of the Afghanistan battlespace forms. The second part comes from the more immediate past.

Allah loves those who fight for his cause in ranks as firm as a mighty edifice.

— Qur'an Surah 61:4, Al-Saff (Battle Array)⁷

During the “Great Game” the British Empire struggled with the Russian czars over control of Central Asia. Afghanistan was the prize, for this land was the centerpiece between Russia’s longing for direct access to a warm water port and England’s determination to keep the land route to India open, at all costs. For as Great Britain knew, without India, there was no British Empire.

The British made several incursions into Afghanistan and succeeded in checking the Russian advance to the south. The British involvement was long and difficult, but the British ascertained the methodologies to manage the Afghan battlespace.

History of Insurgency in Afghanistan

There are countless stories of British valor with charges up icy cliffs to attack Pathans (Pashtuns) firing down on British forces from mountain crags with their long barreled muskets. There are great stories of British troops taking the Khyber Pass to ensure free passage between British India and beyond, and there is one story in particular when a British major ordered his Vickers machine gun team to open fire on an Afghan funeral procession moving through the valley below. They did fire, and what the soldiers found were men under the burkas, and in the coffins were arms and ammunition. No one could figure out how the British major knew that the funeral procession was a cover for hostiles, but as the story goes, he thought like an Afghan. The second tenet in understanding the waging war in Afghanistan is that in order to defeat the insurgent, you must think like him. It is here, in this context, where the second part of our understanding of the Afghanistan battlespace forms. The third part is more recent.

Outside Support

On 25 December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The initial campaign was successful. They controlled the country by land and air. They held the upper hand against the Mujahideen and forced Russia’s will across the nation. In 1980 bin Laden joined the jihad against the Soviets by recruiting fighters from across the Muslim

world and establishing charity organizations to fund the cause. In 1983 he left the Middle East and came to Afghanistan to join the fight. His outside intervention greatly assisted anti-Soviet Afghan forces with the manpower to sustain an in-depth fight against Russian forces. Complicating the anti-Soviet fight was the use of surface-to-air missiles.

Both factors lent towards the systematic entrenchment of Soviet forces in Afghanistan with mainstay aerial platforms under constant engagement, and ground forces under great pressure. As a result, the last Soviet soldiers left Afghanistan on 15 February 1989. The third factor in understanding waging war in Afghanistan is that an insurgency gains success when outside intervention allows the insurgent to defeat government forces by using outside means on the guerrilla's own terms.

Insurgent Leaders and Resistance Fronts

As the Taliban government lost power and became unseated by coalition forces, remnants of the Taliban regime dispersed to sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Reduced to a remnant force, the Afghan resistance objective became to oppose the establishment of a free and democratic Afghanistan through terrorism and subversion. During the 2004 COIN campaign, the specific insurgent forces operating in Afghanistan were the Taliban in the south, the Al Qaeda in the east, and the Hezb-i-Islami (HiG) in the northeast. The Taliban and HiG were the indigenous resistance force, with Al Qaeda constituting the external source of the insurgency, powering the subversion.⁸ As a point of reference, during the American War of Independence, Lord Howe may have looked upon George Washington as the *guerrilla* chief. King George III and his Cabinet could have seen John Adams and Thomas Jefferson as leading *underground* members, and certainly Betsy Ross and the other great colonial dames were probably viewed by the average British officer in the field as the *auxiliary*.

Afghanistan is not an isolated resistance. The Afghan insurgency is in fact a *regional resistance front* in the global insurgency, which Al Qaeda promulgates. Other resistance fronts involve Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Europe, and the U.S. By 2004 the resistance front in Afghanistan was organized into a northern, center, and southern subresistance fronts with area commands constituted in each front.

Northern Resistance Front. This area is from Kabul to the Panshir Valley, westward along the Kabul River and northeast along the Afghan/Pakistan border. The front commander is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. He studied at Kabul University and entered politics, serving at one time in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Soviet-backed Afghanistan government. Hekmatyar was imprisoned for killing a Maoist student and fled to Pakistan where he founded Hezbi Islami. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, he received millions of dollars worth of military and financial aid from the U.S. to fight the communists. When the Soviet-backed government fell in Kabul, Hekmatyar and his party were invited by the new Mujahideen government to help build an Islamic government in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar was offered the Prime Minister position and refused. He opposed the Mujahideen leaders and launched several unsuccessful efforts to seize power in Kabul. In the beginning of 1993 Hekmatyar again was offered the seat of Prime Minister and accepted, serving from March 1993 until January 1994. In early 1994 he became dissatisfied and tried to topple the Islamic government, but failed. In June 1996 Hekmatyar again accepted the position of Prime Minister, but was forced out by the Taliban in late 1996. As the Taliban fell from power, Hekmatyar and the HiG party joined the Afghan resistance allying with the Taliban remnants and Al Qaeda.

Central Resistance Front. This area spans south of the Tora Bora Mountains along the Afghan/Pakistan border and south to Spin Boldak. It spreads west to the Ring Road and the cities of Ghazni and Gardez. The front commander was Jalaluddin Haqqani, a distinguished Mujahideen commander from the Soviet war who later allied with the Taliban. Haqqani rose to prominence as a military leader of the Pashtun resistance to the communist government in Kabul and had allied with the U.S. during the war. After the war, he aligned with the Taliban as they gained power and assisted them in securing control of Nangarhar Province in 1996. The defection was a key factor in securing territorial advantage for the emerging Taliban. At the time, bin Laden was living in the Jalalabad area as a guest of Haqqani. Haqqani led the Taliban's military campaign north of Kabul during the winter of 1996/97, purging the Tajik minority in that area. In 1998 he switched posts, being appointed as the Taliban Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs. Due to his friendship with bin Laden, sev-

eral training camps were built in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar and Paktia.⁹ As the Taliban fell from power, Haqqani fled from Kabul, commenting to local reporters:

We will retreat to the mountains and begin a long guerrilla war to reclaim our pure land from infidels and free our country like we did against the Soviets....We are eagerly awaiting the American troops to land on our soil, where we will deal with them in our own way....The Americans are creatures of comfort. They will not be able to sustain the harsh conditions that await them.¹⁰

Haqqani serves as the Afghan proxy of Al Qaeda in the central front.

Southern Resistance Front. This area included Kandahar north to Qalat, west to the Oruzgan province, and south to the Helmand province. The front commander, Mullah Mohammed Omar, was born in 1959 as the son of a farmer, growing up in the village of Singesar, near Kandahar. Omar reportedly stated that he started the Taliban after a dream in which Allah came to him in the shape of a man, asking him to lead the faithful. There were also practical reasons.

A devout son of Islam, Omar was a mullah in a village madrasah near Kandahar. He had fought alongside the Mujahideen from 1989 to 1992, but began to oppose them as they turned on fellow Afghans and international aid workers. Omar organized fellow ethnic Pashtun followers to stop the Mujahideen from terrorizing women near his village and later to bring law and order to an entire country. His core belief was to create a Muslim state that would practice a strict interpretation of the Koran, one taught in the fundamentalist madrassahs of Pakistan, where Omar went to school. Hence, the Taliban movement was born, backed by the Pakistani secret service, and which gained control over most of the country by 1998.

In 1996 as the Taliban movement gained momentum, Omar accepted the title of *amirul momineen* ("commander of the faithful") in Kandahar, wrapping himself in a cloak said to belong to the prophet Mohammad, a very powerful symbol to the believers. Omar is the first Muslim since the Fourth Caliph, a nephew of Mohammad, to publicly accept the amirul title, a ranking in Islam nearly second to the prophet. Muslims outside Afghanistan did not accept his title. Omar allied with bin Laden and Dr. Zawahiri and supported the Al Qaeda

operation in Afghanistan, but did not condone the exportation of the jihad. As the Taliban government fell, Mullah Omar retreated into the southern reaches of Afghanistan to conduct operations against coalition forces.¹¹

The Enemy Order of Battle

In its simplest terms, the enemy in Afghanistan is codified as the insurgent. By definition, an *insurgency* is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). Members of the insurgent force are organized along political lines to support political, economic, social, military, psychological, and covert operations.

The Afghan insurgency is organized along a traditional insurgent order of battle. The Order of Battle in 2004 included the *guerrilla*, who is the armed insurgent, the *underground*, which is the political and financial wing of the insurgency, and the *auxiliary*, which provides the civilian support to the insurgent.

A great appreciation of the enemy's structure came from reading U.S. Army doctrine from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1980s. Surprisingly, these earlier writings were near exact in the enemy's organizational construct and tactics. Hence, looking at the Afghan insurgency of 2004, the following detail was derived.



Figure 4. On the Afghan border with Pakistan, 23 October 2004, Afghan Security Forces soldier supporting SF COIN operation.

The Guerrilla

Guerrilla—combat element of the insurgency.

Guerrilla warfare—military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

— JP 1-02

In U.S. Army doctrine, the guerrilla is the overt combat element of the insurgency. The members of the guerrilla force organize under military concepts to conduct military and paramilitary operations. Their duties usually include all the overt actions that are conducted by the insurgent organization but may include covert and clandestine operations. They are usually most active in insurgent-controlled or contested areas. However, when the insurgency calls for operations in government-controlled areas, the guerrilla may conduct these operations.

The guerrilla force tries to gain support for the insurgency through propaganda, coercion, and terror. Terrorism is a “weapons system” or technique that the guerrilla applies to achieve his goal. If he cannot gain active support, he will seek *passive* support:

A population that has become submissive to the guerrilla and neutral, siding neither with the insurgency or the government, is an unacceptable state to COIN operations. A people’s neutrality is dangerous, and the silence on the part of the populace concerning insurgent activities is considered passive support for the insurgent.

One of the greatest advantages of the Afghan guerrilla was his ability to hide in the open, well within the sight of counter-guerrilla forces. His invisible stance is due to his early warning network. In the majority of cases, the Afghan guerrilla had established an early warning network that was found to be miles in depth. Generally, the early warning network was oriented along main approach lines that the guerrilla had determined posed the greatest threat to his security and that of the guerrilla base. When any intruder entered the network, the guerrilla was alerted to the entry in time to prepare for the intrusion. It was common to see a huddle of men, crouching down in a cluster watching the movement of coalition forces, with either a cell phone or remote control in their possession to alert others or engage the coalition forces.

The Afghan guerrilla was found to also be extremely familiar with the coalition forces rules of engagement (ROE) and used these rules against the counter guerrilla force. If the ROE prohibit aerial engage-

The Afghan guerrilla was found to also be extremely familiar with the coalition forces rules of engagement (ROE) ...

ment of a target that may produce collateral damage to a house or building, the guerrilla had been known to stand within inches of the structure or in fact be leaning on it. If the ROE stated that unless positive identification is made, and if that positive identification can only be determined if the guerrilla is armed, by the time the counter guerrilla force arrived at the guerrilla's location, he had hidden his arms and joined the waving crowds in the street. Hence, the Afghan guerrilla's advantage was to blend with the local populace. In many cases they were the local populace, for in Afghanistan, as in many other guerrilla wars, the resident guerrilla may only work on a part-time basis.

The Afghan guerrilla's ability to chameleon in front of coalition forces also enhanced their capability to operate with secrecy in a given area. In order to achieve success, a core element for coalition forces became to identify the guerrilla and remove him from the civilian populace. This was best accomplished through the effective use of population and resources control and turning the people against the guerrilla. Care was taken to ensure that civilians were not injured or mistreated as a result of COIN guerrilla operations because during the 2004 campaign, it became pinnacle to use the people as a "weapons system" against the insurgency.

Again, as U.S. Army doctrine noted the guerrilla has advantages, doctrine also states that he has vulnerabilities. The guerrilla normally lacks the personnel and the logistics to intentionally become decisively engaged with COIN guerrilla forces. In many circumstances, as we found in post-World War II doctrine, the proportionality of the COIN guerrilla campaign will force the guerrilla's potential recruiting base to diminish. Effective COIN guerrilla operations will not regenerate follow-on guerrilla insurgent forces. Hence, the guerrilla's vulnerability, open to exploitation, is his source of supply and recruitment. Convince the potential recruit not to join the guerrilla, protect the shopkeeper so he is not forced into supplying the guerrilla, inflict combat losses, force the guerrilla deep into untenable sanctuary, or

interdict their supply lines leads to degrading the guerrilla's ability to sustain.

Additionally, exploit the guerrilla's fear of capture. This vulnerability is paramount to a successful COIN guerrilla campaign. First disseminate, through multiple means and sources, the outcome of capture. Reinforce that the guerrilla is a criminal; internment will mean long (unknown) separation from his family—that is, if he is captured, the family will be disgraced publicly and all which the guerrilla is fighting for will be lost. Any retribution by the guerrilla force against the family of a captured guerrilla is also a key vulnerability and subject to exploitation.

The guerrilla's operational weaknesses often includes security, which requires extensive resources and slows down his responsiveness; bases that are difficult to acquire and operate; and the lack of technology or the ability to maintain captured high-technology items. Another operational weakness may be the lack of sophisticated communications, which could require the guerrilla to spend an excessive amount of time preparing to launch an operation. The guerrilla's dependence on popular support suggests a potential vulnerability because if that support wavers or is withdrawn, the guerrilla will not be able to operate effectively.

These weaknesses and vulnerabilities had great viability in Afghanistan. The Afghan guerrilla avoided direct engagement with coalition forces, so when coalition forces made contact with the guerrilla, contact was maintained. Such was the case with Forward Operating Base (FOB) 31's engagement in the Oruzugan province, at the village of Day Chopan in March of 2004. An SF company team fought a pitched battle with Taliban guerrillas and Al Qaeda revolutionaries as the SF were moving northwest toward Day Chopan. In the second battle of Day Chopan, initial contact had been made with a skirmish line of Taliban who became very clever in judging when to attack the SF and when to disengage when close air support became available. At one point during the battle, SF moved south in what appeared to be a movement out of the area. This feint worked, deceiving the guerrilla into believing a retreat. Instead, the SF company team built combat power and received conventional forces as reinforcement and turned to pursuit operations against the Taliban skirmish line, then into fixed Al Qaeda positions. As the coalition force pressed the attack, the guerrilla force vanished into the countryside avoiding

further contact and trading space for survival. Later, in order to deny the guerrilla insurgent from using this key area for an operations base, an SF base camp was established in the area, effectively occupying the insurgent's zone of action and making it impossible for the insurgency to conduct operations.

As coalition forces continued to expand throughout the insurgent's backyard, other SF base camps like the one at Day Chopan would serve as an outpost that fostered security and ushered in peace. Guerrilla activity was discovered up the Konar River valley. An SF base camp was established in Bari Kowt. The night after the first Chinook dropped off Green Berets and Afghan Security Forces, a convoy of guerrillas in 15 HiLux trucks was spotted heading east towards the Pakistan border. Local villagers joined the effort to construct the base camp, and that region of Afghanistan went from neutral to coalition friendly, effectively removing a potential recruiting base from access by the Afghan guerrilla and his base of support.

The Afghan guerrilla was petrified of capture. When captured, once "gallant" Afghan guerrilla fighters appeared nothing more than sniveling cowards. Such was the case with the guerrilla leader who was captured one morning in a strike operation. He was building a car bomb for a target in Kabul, perhaps the American Embassy. A strike package was launched and placed under U.S. control against the guerrilla leader. His entire demeanor changed when he was brought back to the coalition base. However, what did not change was his pure unadulterated hatred for the coalition.



Figure 5. On guard: Afghan Security Force trooper, 22 October 2004.

The Underground

The *underground* of an insurgency can be defined as combat support of the insurgency and a covert unconventional warfare organization established to operate in areas denied to the guerrilla forces or conduct operations not suitable for guerrilla forces.

— AR 310-25, Dictionary of U.S. Army Terms

The underground organizes into compartmented cells. Cells are formed within various political subdivisions, sectors or areas, such as the U.S. equivalents of counties, towns, and neighborhoods. The underground environment may be urban or rural. Underground members commit sabotage, intelligence gathering, and acts of deception. They are the political and financial wing of the insurgency and are the main element focused on subverting the government. The underground supports the guerrilla and the auxiliary at the direction of the area commander or resistance front commander. They operate in small cells and are linked to other cells through key leaders, intermediaries, or facilitators. The underground operates covertly or overtly, uses safe houses to hide insurgents and will move people and supplies along routes and in vehicles to avoid detection.

In Afghanistan, the underground is mainly the defunct Taliban government. As the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan and became allied with bin Laden, the infrastructure used to support Al Qaeda became the safe houses and sanctuary areas for the underground. The Afghan underground's purpose is to subvert the emerging democratic government of Afghanistan and return Afghanistan to a fundamentalist Islam state.

The Afghan underground during the 2004 COIN campaign seemed to be at a peak of power during this time, directly connected to the Taliban remnants in Pakistan, tied to the Al Qaeda network worldwide, and loosely allied with the HiG in the north. The purpose of their loose alliance was to oppose the coalition. The underground's main purpose was to subvert the emerging Afghan government, to stop it from gaining any recognizable footing, and perpetuate instability in Afghanistan. Instability was the goal for the Taliban who could manage to survive in a semblance of power and simply attrit the coalition over time. Al Qaeda wanted an unstable Afghanistan to continue to fix the U.S., drain American national power, and pull

profit from the drug trade. Finally, the HiG wanted what the Taliban wanted, instability to continue to survive to outlive the coalition intervention in their homeland.



Figure 6. A SF base camp, northeast Afghanistan, 9 March 2004.

The Auxiliary

The *auxiliary* is the organized civilian support to the tactical action arm of the insurgents. In UW, that element of the resistance force established to provide the organized civilian support of the resistance movement.

— AR 310-25

The success or failure of the guerrilla force depends on its ability to maintain logistic and intelligence support. The auxiliary fills support functions by organizing civilians and conducting coordinated support efforts. The assistance of the civilian population is critical to the success of the resistance movement and provides security, intelligence, and logistic support for the guerrilla force by using civilian supporters of the resistance. The auxiliary conducts clandestine support functions by organizing people on a regional, district, or

sector basis depending on the guerrilla force formation. To sustain guerrilla operations, the guerrilla force has numerous needs:

- a. Movement support
- b. Acquisition of supplies
- c. Operational information and intelligence
- d. Medical facilities
- e. Counterintelligence to establish an outer zone security early warning network to detect, if not deter, enemy penetration attempts
- f. Recruiting support
- g. Compartmented communication systems
- h. Current information on terrain, weather, civilians, and local resources
- i. Deception operations support
- j. Manufacture and maintenance of equipment.

The Afghan auxiliary provided the insurgents with all the above support. Auxiliary operations in Afghanistan were centered in the major cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, Qalat, Kandahar, and Herat. Auxiliary lines of communications were organized along old trade routes and way stations and connected the cities to Pakistan and Iran. Predominantly, the routes followed the old Silk Road and its branches, specifically the Tehran, Herat, Bamina, Kabul, Bagram and China route, as well as the Pepper Route that branched off from Kabul to Jadalak, onward to Jalalabad, and into Pakistan/India through Peshawar.¹²

The main auxiliary line of communication in the north was found to be between Kabul and Peshawar, through the Khyber Pass, while in the south the auxiliary line of communication was from Kandahar to Quetta, crossing through Spin Boldak. A third line of communication was found to originate in Spin Boldak, move through the Sami Gahr mountains, into Qalat, then onward into the Oruzugan bowl. This road was named the *Underground Railroad*, while the Spin Boldak route was named the *New Silk Road*. Supplies of all types were imported for the insurgency; however, the main arms dumps were preexistent from the Soviet occupation and cached throughout the insurgents areas of operation.

After gaining some understanding of the enemy, the approach used was a conceptual development of our campaign plan by drawing upon the lessons of history and the available doctrinal resources. Section 4 discusses the process of “historic paralleling” and the guidance we found useful in the joint and Army publications.

4. Historic Paralleling and Principles of COIN Campaigning

The struggle against the guerrilla is not, as one might suppose, a war of lieutenants and captains. The number of troops that must be put in action, the vast areas over which they will be led to do battle, the necessity of coordinating diverse actions over these vast areas, the politico-military measures to be taken regarding the populace, the necessarily close cooperation with various branches of the civil administration—all this requires that operations against the guerrilla be conducted according to a plan, established at a very high command level, capable at any moment of making quick, direct intercession effectively felt in the wide areas affected by modern warfare.

— Roger Trinquier,

Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency

In the autumn of 2003 the CJSOTF-A entered into a formal planning process to effectively reshape the conduct of war in Afghanistan. The J5 Plans section, in conjunction with J2 Intelligence and J3 Operations, began a series of analyses to determine how to fight and win not only against the Afghan insurgent but also the insurgency. The strategy centered on depicting the enemy order of battle and developing succinct plans to remove or reduce each enemy element.

Historic Paralleling

The first part of CJSOTF-A COIN campaign planning was to conduct a review of previous COIN campaigns and find historic parallels.

This initial step built an important frame of reference for the future, which was based upon successes in the past. The objective of the historic paralleling was to map out the condition of the battlespace, determine to some level of certainty where the insurgency would be heading, and reach back into previous wars to lay out a strategy for the future.

Conduct a review. Afghanistan, as well as the rest of Central Asia and the Middle East, is a land tightly bound to its past. The forming, shaping, and reforming of the country are tied to many fathers, and those fathers have seen trials and tribulations that become a library of lessons for the future. The Afghan is very predictable in their habits. What was done in the past seems to be the norm for the future. The familiarity and expertise that the Afghan has with the terrain proved to be the same ground he would fight war after war. The way the Afghan fought was equally replicated war after war. As attempts were made to compare previous wars to the Global War on Terrorism, the initial consensus was the Afghans were fighting coalition forces as they fought during the Soviet War. The actuality was that the Soviet comparison was limited. The Afghan was not fighting the coalition like they fought the last war. There were more historic parallels found to the British era than to the Russians. The general reasoning for this was that the British understood the Afghan culture and did attempt to coexist with them. The Russians, however, went to force Russian culture and ways on the Afghans and that of course was unacceptable to the Afghan. Russian tactics were destructive, bombing and shelling villages into rubble and forcing a million person refugee flight into neighboring countries.

An understanding of Afghan tactics became imperative to historic paralleling. Delineating their tactical conduct became essential in understanding how to counter insurgent operations. Afghan insurgent tactics against the coalition were similar to how the Afghans fought the British. Insurgent tactics involved the following:

- a. Yielding the population centers
- b. Operating from the rural areas
- c. Passive and active espionage against coalition forces
- d. Infiltration into the coalition allied government structure
- e. Ambushes, long-range sniping, and harassment fires (typically with rockets)
- f. Frontal assaults against coalition bases (very rare)
- g. Terrorism, especially propaganda, threats, intimidation, and subjugation.

The Afghan insurgent would hide in the open, with no distinguishing insignia or uniform, and avoid contact with coalition forces electing

to engage with remotely controlled improvised explosive devices or with harassment rocket fire.

The Afghan insurgent, like his father and grandfather, was, in many cases, a part-time fighter. During the day, he would tend his fields or his store in the market and take care of his family, but at night or off hours, he would attack. In general, the Afghan insurgent's tactic would move into attack positions before evening prayer, attack after the evening prayer, then retreat after the attack. Attacks

During the day, [the Afghan insurgent] would tend his fields or store in the market and take care of his family, but at night or off hours, he would attack.

generally occurred on Fridays because Saturday was a day off, and the insurgent did not have to work the next day. Attacks occurred during periods of lunar illumination, so the insurgent could maneuver at night with some semblance of natural light, and the insurgent would attack towards the end of the month so he could add to the final tally of attacks that month for which he would get paid. When all these factors lined up—that is, a full moon, on a Friday, at the end of the month—it was obvious that an insurgent attack was pending.

Supporting the Afghan insurgent were the front-line professionals from Al Qaeda. Assessments revealed that Al Qaeda “revolutionaries” had taken to the field in support of Taliban and HiG fighters. Reports of foreign fighters were rampant in the late part of 2003 and early 2004, which were later proved with the capture of several foreign fighters inside Afghanistan. When the revolutionaries arrived, it was indicative that an Al Qaeda key event was about to occur. These fighters were better equipped than the Afghan insurgent and were full-time professionals. They acted as trainers, shock troops, and surrogate leaders. Their tactics were essentially guerrilla tactics, but their objectives satisfied Al Qaeda goals, which were complimentary to that of the Afghan insurgent. Specifically, the Taliban and HiG were essentially political parties of Afghanistan who had lost power and now through force of arms were trying to regain power. Impeding their ability to do so were coalition forces, such as the American Joint Task Force. Victory for the Afghan insurgent would come by forcing the coalition out of Afghanistan. Consequentially, the Al Qaeda faction wanted the coalition, especially the U.S., out of the

Muslim world, making the western presence in Afghanistan a lucrative target.

In the beginning of 2004 the Afghan battlespace had matured with three enemy formations operating in subresistance fronts. Looming on the horizon were the first elections since the fall of the Taliban. Initially scheduled for June 2004 the presidential election was moved to October 2004 for logistics in conducting the election. In the lead for the elections was the United Nations assistance mission to Afghanistan, with the coalition in general support. Additionally, towards the spring of 2004, the opium crop was coming to market

Initial estimates were that the opium crop would come in at about \$750 million. Placed on the open market at a conservative estimate of 10 fold, the wholesale value meant that when the crop reached retail in overseas markets, the overall yield could be estimated at \$7.5 billion. Considering a 5 percent profit factor for the Afghan insurgency, their total would tally to \$375 million. At \$30 million per year to operate Al Qaeda, even a third of the profit (\$125 million) going to Al Qaeda would fund the organization for more than 4 years. Correct in our assumptions or not, the illegal drug trade was a very important factor in understanding the insurgency.

Finally, constant reports from various sources that bin Laden and Dr. Zawahiri were hiding in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas or the old British northwest frontier completed the outlay of a very cluttered environment, which involved enemy senior leadership in hiding, three enemy subfronts conducting full spectrum subversion and insurgency operations in cooperation, the opium trade, multinational coalition and allied forces collaboration, and birthing of a new and very unstable democracy. Against this backdrop emerged the historic parallels that developed the strategy to defeat the Afghan insurgency.

Find historic parallels. Historically, there are two types of insurgencies:

- a. *Mass populace* involves the mass mobilization of the people against the reigning government. A textbook example of this is Mao Zedong. Confronted with the goal of overthrowing the Nationalist government, Mao saw that he needed to mobilize the people and place the peasant against the government. Through cadre elements, mass mobilization of the populace,

and direct and indirect pressures, he was able to defeat the government.

- b. *Minority revolt* involves a small faction taking on the government and, through political subversion and if necessary force of arms, defeating the government. The people remain neutral, but over time are swayed to support the insurgency. Fidel Castro's overthrow of the Batista government is a clear example of the minority revolt.

The assessment for Afghanistan recognized that a minority revolt was in place. Hence, from the initial analysis that Afghanistan was a complex environment, in a congested battlespace of allied, coalition, indigenous and joint forces, with a minority revolt in full motion, against a multi-party insurgent force that was mimicking past practices and alliances, and the existence of an external source powering the minority revolt, a COIN strategy was developed that employed specific historic parallels.

Defining the enemy order of battle and their tactics became key elements in fighting the insurgency. Who were we fighting? Why were they fighting us? How were they fighting us? How do we fight them? The historic parallels that answered these questions came from U.S. Army doctrine, especially UW, counter guerrilla, and guerrilla warfare doctrine from the 1950s and 1960s, which was based on **World War II**. These manuals (see References) described the enemy order of battle as the guerrilla, underground, and auxiliary; demonstrated how guerrillas conducted ambushes; and portrayed how to conduct counter guerrilla operations to strike at the guerrilla and find, fix, and finish enemy forces.

The second part of the COIN strategy was understanding what caused and continued to power the insurgency.

It is not enough to eliminate the guerrilla force, which is simply treating the symptom. What becomes necessary is to remove the causes of instability that perpetuate the insurgency, which then allows for the development of a strategy to systematically reduce or remove the instability, which in turn deprives the fuel that propels the fire, in fact curing the disease.

The success in **El Salvador** became the historic parallel for removing causes of instability. As history shows, the Government of El Salvador defeated the insurgency under the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) by addressing the demands by the guerrillas. Of predominance to the insurgency was land reform. Once the Government of El Salvador initiated a program of granting the peasants ownership of the land, the insurgency lost power. The government's further drive was to reduce the guerrilla problem to criminal activity and offer the FMLN an opportunity to compete for power in a political arena, which led to the defeat of the insurgent and the insurgency.

The third part was that once the insurgency was on the decline, security responsibility was transitioned to local forces so that allied forces could move to strategic over watch.

As the insurgents were defeated by applying U.S. Army doctrine, and the causes of instability were removed through a historic parallel to El Salvador experience, the British COIN campaign in **Malaya** proved to be a useful analogue. A key element to the Malayan campaign was the ability to have local forces secure the country after allied forces found and finished infiltrators. The British developed a self-securing policy where areas that were cleared of insurgent activity were turned into "white areas" that were secured by indigenous security forces assisted by the British. Hence, the Malayan COIN campaign demonstrated the third-step concept.

The fourth part of the COIN strategy was that using indigenous forces is an essential technique in finding the enemy.

No one knows the people and the terrain better than the local populace. As the **Viet Minh and Vietnam** wars demonstrated, employment of indigenous forces to conduct COIN operations is the mandate. The local populace know their communities—they know who lives there and who is transient.

The **French and Indian War** was the fifth historic parallel that suggested how to organize the multitude of friendly forces in Afghanistan. During that campaign, both the British and French employed combined, joint, indigenous, and reserve forces as a unified force.

The forces available to combat the insurgency in Afghanistan also were varied and numbered. Not only were there indigenous forces on the battlefield but also allied, coalition, and multiservice forces involved in Afghanistan.

Algeria became the sixth model that informed our COIN planning for operations in Afghanistan. Colonel Roger Trinquier, in *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, delineated the following principles for COIN operations:

...separate the guerrilla from the population that supports him; occupy the zones that the guerrillas previously operated from, making them dangerous for him and turning the people against the guerrilla movement; and coordinate actions over a wide area and for a long enough time that the guerrilla is denied access to the population centers that could support him.¹³

This Trinquier formulation provided the central operating concept for our operations.

The seventh historic parallel, the **American Revolution** of 1776, suggested the overall concept of the COIN campaign. As then, the people of Afghanistan were fighting against a tyranny—terrorism. As will be discussed in subsequent sections, the American Revolution also became the overall theme of the SOF support plan to the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 76 COIN campaign, with several operations named after American Revolution battles.

Principles of COIN Applicable to Afghanistan

With the seven historic parallels analyzed, COIN operations in Afghanistan coalesced around these traditional COIN principles:

- a. Separate the guerrilla from the populace.
- b. Occupy the underground's zone(s) of action so they are unable to conduct political and financial operations.
- c. Protect the population centers so civilian support is unavailable to the insurgency.

Separate the guerrilla from the populace. In a COIN campaign, the guerrilla is the leading cause of instability. Clearing the guerrilla from the battlefield is an essential task. The purpose is to be able to remove or reduce the guerrilla threat from an organized combat force to crimi-

nal activity. Once that end state is achieved, indigenous security forces can manage the reduced threat, and allied and coalition forces can move to strategic over watch. In order to clear the guerrilla from the battlefield, the guerrilla must be separated from the populace. The guerrilla has sanctuary among the people, and it becomes very difficult to isolate them. Techniques to separate the guerrilla from the populace are as follows:

- a. Use local sources to identify the guerrilla.
- b. Conduct cordon-and-search operations and collect biometric data on all males of fighting age who are cordoned for later reference.
- c. Enter the enemy's information systems and ascertain their location, disposition, and intent.
- d. Conduct checkpoint (fixed and mobile) to search for guerrillas moving along primary and secondary lines of communication, which in turn forces the guerrilla to travel along back roads and footpaths, making it more difficult to move in and around the battlespace.
- e. Conduct company level and below strike operations. (Operations above the company level fail due to the size of the force and the effectiveness of the enemy's early warning network.)

Occupy the underground's zone(s) of action. The main element of the insurgency, the underground, conducts political and financial operations to subvert the government and instill within the populace the people's lack of confidence in the government's ability to protect them. The objective in this principle is to occupy the underground's area of operation so they cannot come out in the open and conduct subversion operations. Two techniques for occupying the underground's zone of action follow:

- a. *Occupy by presence* entails establishing base camps in the areas where the underground operates and along main/known lines of enemy communications. This involves moving to the location of the enemy, a substantial and incredibly important effort. In general, once friendly forces occupy an area, they settle in and remain in place. This in turn becomes a rock in a stream, and the water simply flows around or over it. In order to be successful in COIN operations, friendly forces must find the enemy and maintain contact.

- b. *Occupy without presence* relies on aggressive short- and long-range patrolling, where friendly forces project combat power from their bases throughout the underground's zone of action and conduct patrols to interview the population on the location and activities of the underground. Another idea is to establish neighborhood watches and routine contact with local police forces. For neighborhood watches, the technique is for the friendly force to have town meetings with local leaders and the populace, discussing the security situation and offering solutions to their problems. The real goal is for the locals to identify underground leaders and facilitators so they can be killed or captured. With local police, friendly forces can equip the police with radios and construct/renovate police stations. By staying in touch with the police, civil information is provided that can be analyzed and enemy trends developed in order to delineate enemy intent.



Figure 7. Jingle trucks heading into Afghanistan from Pakistan in October signal improvement for the legitimate economy.

Protect the population centers. The insurgency gains its support, shelter, food, and supplies from the auxiliary. If the civilian support is unavailable to the insurgency, then the insurgency withers. The aim of this principle is to secure the auxiliary from providing support to the insurgency. Techniques for accomplishing this task are to make it more lucrative for the auxiliary to work for the coalition than to work for the insurgency. Hence, reconstruction projects that employ large swaths of people not only put money into the economy but also employ the insurgent. Using the local main supply points to sustain the coalition buys out supplies that were available to the insurgent, but are now being consumed by friendly forces. Employing local transport for delivery of coalition supplies means that the enemy fighters, weapons, and supplies cannot be transported. Building or repairing damage roads not only employs the auxiliary on behalf of the coalition but also allows the insurgent to travel these roads, subjecting them to interdiction. Of course, whenever local supplies and transport are used, coalition forces must have systems in place to ensure that the enemy does not use transport, services, and goods against the coalition.

After selection of the appropriate COIN principals to apply in Afghanistan, the campaign plan was put into production. Planners, operators, intelligence, and specialists crafted the defeat plan for the Afghan insurgency. However, the execution of the plan is dependent on the command and control mechanism that provides for maximum flexibility, adaptability, and speedy execution, all in decentralized operations while keeping unity of effort. The next section discusses the issues of command and control during the 2004 campaign, to include key functions of command and control and the intelligence, plans, and operations cycle.

5. Optimizing Command, Control, and Coordination in a COIN Environment

The CJSOTF-A as a Joint Task Force has theater-wide responsibilities for the conduct of special operations in the joint operations area. Typically the CJSOTF is commanded by an SF group commander and constituted with SF battalions. SF has this predominate role due to its training, organizational structure, equipment, doctrine, leadership, and agility to deploy on a short timeline and successfully effect UW, combating terrorism, special reconnaissance, direct action, or foreign internal defense.¹⁴

Orchestrating the conduct of special operations, especially during a COIN campaign, requires expertise in SOF operational art. Organization is the key to military success, and command and control nodes are the mechanism for organizing it. Disorganized military command and control nodes are ineffective in conducting combat operations. Any new commander must ensure that he has a trained, organized, and equipped command and support node prior to entering into the fight. Successful succession of combat activities cannot be sustained without forward thinking, responsive, and disciplined officers and noncommissioned officers to manage and sustain the campaign. Hence prior to combat, command, control, and support nodes must be in place, exercised, resourced, and immersed in the operational environment prior to the first combat unit crossing the line of departure. Once that is completed, operations can be initiated, for once a force is committed, it is very difficult to recover from failure or loss of control.

The span of control of the CJSOTF-A in 2004 was over a 4,000 man force consisting of SF battalion task forces with subordinate SF company teams, a U.S. naval special warfare task unit, tactical psychological teams, a civil affairs company team (foreign internal defense/UW), joint tactical air control parties, and irregular forces consisting of Afghan Security Forces.

The expanse of the area controlled was accomplished with 17 remote SF base camps positioned along the eastern and southern

parts of the country. The SF base camps varied in combat power, but generally consisted of an SF detachment(s), U.S. infantry, irregular indigenous forces (Afghan Security Forces), a mortar section, and a variety of crew-served weapons positions. Each base was a defensible location from which SF task-organized formations conducted COIN operations in their joint special operations area.

In order to apply the COIN campaign principles, we had to codify the command, control, and coordination functions of the CJSOTF-A. The methodology to do so was organizing the command along functional lines. Specifically, the CJSOTF-A was organized along six operational functions: operational command and control, operational maneuver, operational intelligence, operational fires, operational sustainment, and operational force protection.

Figure 8.
On patrol in
Afghanistan,
23 September 2004.



Operational command and control. How the command executed operations was the primary responsibility of the command group, which included the commander, deputy commander, executive officer, and command sergeant major. This group managed the functions of the command in an interactive construct that empowered leaders to lead and work within the set of priorities, parameters, and resources available for combat operations.

The commander established the command and control mechanisms, such as reports he required for situational awareness; battle rhythm to set the pace of the command; the plans, operations, and intelligence (POI) cycle; and the placement of key officers to concep-

tualize, plan, execute, and sustain COIN operations. The commander and the command sergeant major, accompanied by selected special staff, embarked on weekly battlefield circulation to visit every SF base camp, assessing first hand the execution of the COIN operation and validating what was planned, executable, and sustainable.

The deputy commander led in the absence of the commander, performed as chief of staff, and interfaced with the CJTF 76. As chief of staff, he placed himself at key points on the battlefield during sensitive or main effort operations and reinforced the staff management process.

The command sergeant major, as the senior enlisted advisor, played a key role in the command. In an organization where the preponderance of the force consists of noncommissioned officers, the command sergeant major worked with the senior enlisted of the subordinate commands to ensure compliance with directives, sustain morale, and maintain battlefield discipline.



Figure 10.
Commander's
strategy
meeting with
principal staff,
1 February 2004.

Operational maneuver. This function involves positioning forces on the battlefield in a manner that will give the tactical units a positional advantage or a mobility differential over the adversary. The objective for operational maneuver was usually a center of gravity or decisive point. The operational maneuver cycle involved action, reaction, and counteraction management by the operations order.

Functionally, the epicenter for operational maneuver is the Joint Operations Center (JOC), managed by the J3. The CJSOTF operated a digital command post arrayed in a theatre configuration with secure automation for principal and special staff battle captains, liaison officers, the command group, and coalition commanders. Adjoining the JOC were the J3's office and a J3 conference room, which was used for commander conferences, staff huddles, crisis action planning (responsibility of the J3, not the J5), and sensitive discussions. The J3 shop was organized with a current operations section that covered a period from 0 to 96 hours out, with a primary responsibility to track the battle, look ahead 24 hours to 96 hours to adjust resources to support the fight, and provide situational awareness and reporting one layer of command up and down. Under the J3 was the J33, who was the battle captain responsible for battle tracking during his shifts and covering a 0 to 24-hour period. The J35 translated the operations plan into an operations order once the date and time of the operation was determined.

Operational intelligence. Essential to conducting COIN operations is operational intelligence. Successful use of intelligence can be realized when the command is able to enter into the enemy's decision-making process and exploit it in favor of the command. The CJSOTF-A organized operational intelligence under J2 Intelligence. The J2 acted as the focal point for intelligence, high value and mid-value target (HVT and MVT), target development, and battle damage assessment. The J2 was the lead in ensuring intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support was available to the command, functional components, and subordinate forces. The J2 published the command's intelligence requirements, conducted the joint targeting board for sensitive targeting, served on the Combined Effects Board, synchronized human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) efforts, and integrated multisource information and multiechelon intelligence into all-source intelligence products.

The J2 organized a Joint Analysis and Control Element, a section of the J2 composed of analytical experts who were instrumental in assisting the commander to understand how the adversary plans, operates, and reacts to coalition operations. The J2 also supervised HUMINT collection and CI activities. Also nested under the J2 structure was a National Intelligence Support Team, which provided

mission tailored national intelligence reach-back capability to supporting national agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, CIA, National Security Agency, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency. A Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC) provided technical assistance in the management of recovery, exploitation, and disposal of captured enemy equipment. Additionally, a Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) was available for initial screening and interrogation of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), translation and exploitation of captured adversary documents, and debriefing of captured or detained U.S. personnel released or escaped from adversary control.

Operational fires. This function can support maneuver, isolate parts of the battlefield, and attack key enemy functions or targets. Initially, the main fire support mechanism provided to the CJSOTF was air support. Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) published by the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) aligned the type of air support available to the command. Whether it was A-10s, B-1, or other fixed-wing aircraft, an ATO placed the air support on station for the command. The ATO was the primary means of shaping the operational level fight and provided rapid response to the SF base camps across the theatre of operations. Conducted on a daily basis, the ATO reviewed the nominated targets and missions, deconflicted targeting and support, and published the ATO book that contained information pertaining to the next day's ATO, such as supported target list, ATO, divert list, critical target list, battlespace shaping matrix, and special instructions.

Further into the campaign, close combat attack—consisting of AH-64s and AH-1s—came on station with 105-mm and 155-mm artillery coming online as an extension of other indirect fire systems such as 60-mm, 81-mm, 82-mm, and 102-mm mortars.

Operational sustainment. These functions were those that the command administered (including personnel, pay input, religion, and legal support services), supplied, and maintained, including health services, transportation, and general engineering. The J4 led this function, which managed joint special operations area wide common user logistics (CUL) support, logistics planning and served on/interfaced with the Joint Logistics Center, Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board, Joint Facilities Utilization Board, Theater Patient Movement

Requirements Center, Joint Blood Program Office, and the Joint Mortuary Affairs Office.

Functionally, operational sustainment was organized as follows:

- a. Support Center, which housed the J4, but had two annexes, one for the staff judge advocate, mail room, and J1
- b. Medical Center, which housed the surgeon and dentist.

The Motor Pool area was not only the maintenance section but served as a retrofit center for vehicles.

Operational force protection. Functions that protect the force and its base(s) of operation against enemy attack constituted operational force protection. As previously mentioned, the command operated across up to 17 SF base camps, all of which had the same force protection requirements. Additionally, with SF operating across the theater of operations, a missing or captured special operator was a great concern. The staff engineer (J8) was responsible for the construction of SF base camps, including stand-off, fighting positions, and defensive measures. The J3 assumed responsibility for joint personnel recovery, organizing battle drills, establishing standing procedures, and obtaining equipment to conduct personnel recovery.

Battle Rhythm

With the command organized along operational functions, command and control mechanisms in place, and coordination ongoing, all that remained prior to conducting COIN operations was to establish the cycle of command and control actions within the JOC, or battle rhythm. It was an extension of the familiar military decision-making process found in Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 (Staff Organization and Operations), and it integrated other doctrinal concepts such as the SOF planning and targeting cycle described in Joint Pub 3-05.1 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations) and the joint targeting cycle phases in Joint Pub 3-60 (Joint Doctrine for Targeting). The battle rhythm cycle of operations and planning described here was appropriate for our operations in Afghanistan in 2004, but each command develops its own battle rhythm to contend with an ever-changing operational environment.

The command's battle rhythm drove the operational cycle for over 4,000 special operations and indigenous irregular forces per-

sonnel engaged in continuous, active combat. The battle rhythm was a formal process that allowed the CJSOTF commander and staff to organize reporting, coordination, planning, sustainment, and mission execution. The battle rhythm was how the commander organized the information he received in order to make the necessary decisions to fight and win.

The battle rhythm was developed to maximize command, control, and coordination, yet avoid meetings. In general, as leaders find themselves entombed in a series of meetings, they are unable (unavailable) to develop and implement direction and guidance. Hence, the focus of the CJSOTF-A was to compress the meetings in the morning and evening, which resulted in allowing for work between the morning and evening synchronization blocks. Additionally, when meetings occurred, they were either for coordination or for information exchange. Coordination meetings did not adjourn until coordination was enacted. Information meetings were succinct providing the information and recommendations that the commander would need to either make a decision, provide additional guidance, receive the guidance, or provide assistance.

The battle rhythm was designed to exchange information, build dialogue, and disseminate information across the week, so that it was not all presented at once and thereby become overwhelming. Over the course of any given week, the leadership of the CJSOTF-A would focus upon the state of the command, the day-to-day management of COIN operations, mid- and long-term plans and planning, primary and special staff updates and assessments, intelligence preparation of the battlespace, trends analysis, joint targeting boards, and command reviews. Every function and responsibility of the command was reviewed and updated over the course of the week. What follows is a description of the key meetings and activities that, in the aggregate, influence the battle rhythm.

The morning update. Each morning the command would convene in a series of updates to inform the commanders and their staffs of the friendly and enemy situations. The first item of business was the intelligence update, Monday through Friday. The commander and the battle staff would meet and discuss the enemy situation as it occurred in the past 24 hours. With this intelligence backdrop, the command would thereafter reconvene in the JOC for the commander's update briefing (CUB), Monday through Sunday. During the

CUB, the commander and staff would receive information from the staff and subordinate commanders on the status of current operations and operations within the next 24 hours. The CUB served as a mechanism to adjust current operations to maintain contact with the enemy.

Battlefield circulation. The commander must always see the battlefield for himself. He needs to understand how his command can dominant the fight and defeat the enemy. To do so, he must be away from the headquarters and be among the soldiers. A commander isolated by his staff and subordinate commanders fails to command because he has relegated his responsibilities to others, in turn leading from behind, not from the front. Every Monday after the CUB, the commander, command sergeant major, and selected staff would fly to visit an SF unit (battalion, company, and/or detachment) at one of the SF base camps. The purpose of such visits was to see first hand the operational effectiveness of the unit(s), conduct face-to-face coordination with key leaders, observe the interaction between the officers and the noncommissioned officers, assess the living conditions of the base camps, ensure combat readiness, and understand the



Figure 10. CJSOTF-A command visit to SOF unit in Afghanistan, 14 June 2004.

operational environment. The command group would rest overnight at a base camp, returning the following day. Generally, the battlefield circulation effort would transit the battalion forward operating bases, and the commander could visit with the battalion commander prior to transiting to an SF base camp. Optimally, a member of the staff accompanying the commander would compile a list of notes from the commander's visit and transmit that back to the executive officer for action.

The evening update. In the evening, Monday through Sunday, the commander would participate in the CJTF 76 battle or commander's update briefing. Using Microsoft NetMeeting, the commander would remotely participate with the other commands under the JTF and update the commanding general on the key activities that the CJSOTF conducted that day. This process proved to be an effective means for the commanding general to deliver commander's intent, gain an appreciation of the various commands' success, and stay on plan. The CJSOTF-A commander would also conduct a NetMeeting on Tuesday and Friday with the subordinate commanders to share information and provide direction. On Wednesdays the commander would conduct a video teleconference (VTC) with the rear detachment at Fort Bragg to exchange information, provide direction, and receive updates on rear detachment operations. This VTC became important to coordinate disciplinary actions, disposition of wounded and killed in action, and family support matters.

Synchronization Boards and Meetings

Intelligence, plans, operations (IPO) cycle. The task force executive officer, in his capacity as chief of staff, ran the IPO cycle. On Monday mornings the executive officer would convene a Joint Planning Group where the J2, J3, and J5 and executive officer would analyze the intelligence preparation of the battlespace, trend analysis, and significant activities and ascertain enemy intent. Based upon these discussions, the Joint Planning Group would develop a concept of COIN operations for review by the staff. Note that during COIN operations, the military decision-making process is ongoing. There is no convenient start and end point to mission planning in a COIN campaign; it is a rolling planning process, in fact a continuous planning group. Likewise, intelligence preparation of the battlespace is also continu-

ous. An intelligence estimate changes daily, an appraisal of enemy intent evolves weekly, and the enemy situation evolves monthly. In order to keep pace with the fluidity of the COIN, rolling staff estimates became the normal course for mission planning.

The staff would prepare an estimate from the intelligence, plans, and operations concept and ascertain the level of feasibility of the concept. On Wednesdays the entire staff would convene and brief staff estimates that could support the concept, now evolving the concept into a plan. On Friday the plans chief would conduct the commander's plans update and provide a status to the commander on the plans under development. During this update, the staff would provide information to the commander, seek his guidance, get a decision, and ask for assistance. Based upon the outcome of the update, the cycle would continue until the J5 published an operations plan and the J35 translated it to an operations order. Once a date and time group was affixed to the plan, the J3 implemented and managed it.

In order to coordinate plans with our higher and adjacent headquarters, the J5 would participate in joint planning groups at the CJTF 76, visit the J35 section of the Joint Task Force, and on Fridays, host an informal planners forum over or after dinner, at the CJSOTF to discuss planning intent, progress, and synchronization.

Combined effects board (CEB). Combining the effects of kinetic and nonkinetic fires into achieved designated results is the core purpose of the CEB. Convening on Tuesday, from 0530 to 0630 (Zulu time), the CEB worked through a monthly process that determined enemy vulnerabilities, developed targets, presented targets for decision, and assessed the effectiveness of the targeting.

Battle update assessment (BUA). The BUA was actually the main meeting for the commander because it gave him the status of the operational responsibilities of the command for priorities (what to do first, what to do last), parameters (the limits—constraints and restraints), and the resources (what is available to conduct COIN operations). Convened on Thursday, the BUA involved the entire staff.

A BUA was the most important of all the meetings or boards that the command conducted. At the Joint Task Force or divisional level, a BUA was constructed along operational functions, starting with the communications status of the command delineating who

NOTIONAL AGENDA	
BATTLE UPDATE ASSESSMENT FOR DDMMYY	
COMMUNICATIONS STATUS ¹⁵	G/J/C6
COMBAT POWER ¹⁶	G/J/C3 CHOPS
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE	(G/J/C2 LEAD)
WEATHER	SWO
GUA TEMPLATE	G/J/C2
ENEMY INTENT	G/J/C2
ISR COVERAGE	G/J/C2
OPERATIONAL MANEUVER	(G/J/C3 LEAD)
SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES	G/J/C3
EXECUTION STATUS FOR STRIKE OPERATIONS	G/J/C3
EXECUTION STATUS OF CIVIC ACTION ¹⁷	ENGINEER
FACE TO FACE ENGAGEMENTS	POLAD
FUTURE OPERATIONS/PLANS	G/J/C5 PLANS
OPERATIONAL FIRES	(ECOORD LEAD)
EFFECTS AND JOINT TARGETING BOARDS	EFFECTS COORD
STATUS OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT	ALO
STATUS OF CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK	AVIATION
INFORMATION OPERATIONS ¹⁸	IO COORD
PUBLIC AFFAIRS	PAO
OPERATIONAL SUSTAINMENT	(G/J/C4 LEAD)
PERSONNEL STATUS AND POSTAL OPNS	G/J/C1
LOGISTICS	G/J/C4
MOVEMENT CONTROL	JMCC
BASE OPERATIONS	ENGINEER
STATUS OF FUNDING	G/J/C8
LEGAL ACTIONS	SJA
STATUS OF MEDICAL CARE AND INJURED	SURGEON
RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES	CHAPLAIN
OPERATIONAL FORCE PROTECTION	PMO
STATUS OF BASE SECURITY	PMO
STATUS OF MSR SECURITY	PMO
PERSONNEL RECOVERY	JPRC
SAFETY	SAFETY OFFICER
OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL	(CHIEF OF STAFF)
COMMANDING GENERAL/DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL	
– SUPPORT, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL	
– OPERATIONS, AND CHIEF OF STAFF	

Figure 11. BUA Sample

the command could speak to and who could listen, followed by the combat power available to conduct the COIN operation. Next, the BUA would continue with operational intelligence, which delineated the disposition and intent of the enemy and the factors affecting operations such as weather, ISR coverage, and status of collection assets. Operational maneuver followed with a briefing on how the command was conducting operations against the enemy. In a COIN operation, maneuver includes kinetic and nonkinetic operations, specifically the strike operations to kill or capture the insurgent and the status of civic actions to remove the causes of the insurgency. Maneuver requires decisions on prioritization, parameters, and resourcing. Cross military boundary operations with other units was always discussed. Operational sustainment followed with a status on the level of support to the maneuver forces. The BUA closed with operational force protection issues concerning how we were protecting our bases and command, control, and support nodes.

The focus of the presentation was on an assessment of the level of success in achieving campaign goals and objectives for fighting the insurgency. Hence during a BUA, the command and the commander gained an appreciation of the fight, with a full picture on how effective the organization is in conducting operations. The BUAs ended with commander comments, specifically focused on providing direction to the command, especially as it related to prioritization and resourcing. After general officers departed the BUA, the chief of staff would cover the due outs and suspense dates for the newly assigned tasks. What follows is an example of a battle update assessment agenda.

Joint targeting board (JTB). The JTB convened Monday, Wednesday, and Friday from 0830 to 0930Z or when required. The JTB consisted of the commander, J2, J5, J9, and other Joint Task Forces and agencies operating in Afghanistan. This was a collaborative process, which generated agreed actions that were synchronized across the joint operations area. The process was initiated with an intelligence summary and followed by a discussion of which targets should be actuated. Once each organization agreed to their target set, the organizations would adjourn to place the target(s) in their own targeting process. Hence the JTB acted as an executive committee where

empowered leaders from each organization would agree to develop and deconflict target sets for action.

Weekly intelligence update (WIU). The WIU was critical to understanding the enemy and entering into his decision-making process. Held on Saturday, the WIU was a presentation on the current or updated intelligence preparation of the battlespace, trends analysis, and predicative analysis. The update started with a roll-up of significant intelligence reports, key enemy activities, and outside influences or items of significance in the area of interest. Discussions would take place with an end result of building an appreciation of the enemy situation and intent that would feed the Monday morning Joint Planning Group.

Choir practice. The battle rhythm, as a weekly battle tempo, ended on Saturday with the officers and the command sergeant major adjourning to the Green Beret Club West for an informal discussion on the conduct of operations. The commander would cover key events and discussions with the command group at CJTF 76 and enter into an in-depth analysis with the staff on the progress and direction of the COIN campaign. Choir Practice offered a unique opportunity for unfettered opinions to be presented in order for the commanders and his staff to gain different perspectives on the conduct of the war in Afghanistan. Choir Practice was a means whereby the commander could apply a barometer to current and future operations and personally determine successes or failures, based on the comments of his SOF leaders.

The battle rhythm organized the command's functions, and it forced synchronization by requiring attendance at a series of meetings and updates that placed the right people in the right place to make the right, informed decisions. The battle rhythm also included times to rest. A command consumed with the minute-by-minute management of operations is reactive. When the command is reacting, the enemy is winning. When the enemy is reacting to us, we are winning and that is what battle rhythm does—organizes the command to fight and win the COIN campaign.

The command and staff planning activities described above were translated into combat operations on the ground. What follows is a view of the strategy, objectives, and combat operations conducted from 2002 to 2004.

6. Combat Operations in Afghanistan: Find, Fix, and Finish the Enemy and Remove the Causes of Instability

On 19 October 2001, the U.S. commenced a counterterrorist campaign to deny use of Afghanistan territory as a terrorist base of operations. The counterterrorism campaign ended in May 2002 and moved immediately to the next level of UW, those operations ending in June 2004.

The goals achieved during the UW campaign were to assist the people of Afghanistan in building a free and democratic nation, build the institutions of national government, and replace the elements of the oppressive Taliban government. However, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and HiG, though dislodged from power, had moved to a war of subversion and terror. Their goal was to destroy the emerging democracy in Afghanistan. On 1 June 2004, a combined, indigenous, joint, and special operations team dispersed across Afghanistan in extremely austere and arduous conditions to bring the campaign to the next level.¹⁹

A major milestone of the COIN campaign came on 9 October 2004, as the people of Afghanistan went to the polling stations and voted. This development was an unparalleled success because of the secure environment provided by the CJTF 76 intensive operations against the core elements of the Afghan insurgency.

The Enemy's Strategy

The J2 intelligence staff assessed that the enemy's long-term strategy was to outlast the coalition. The several enemy groups shared short- to mid-term objectives, which were cooperative, even though their final objectives may have been in conflict. The enemy was assessed to have the will to relentlessly pursue their objectives using resources and capabilities possessed or gained. One of the enemy's strengths was that he understood the strengths and weaknesses of his forces relative to coalition forces and would adapt their behavior accordingly. The assessment was that the enemy leadership had coherent objectives and had organized into fronts of resistance.

Indications and reporting validated the enemy's intent to attrit coalition forces, embarrass the participating nations due to the lack of results and high costs, and out-compete the pro-Western government of Afghanistan in the election. They would negate the central government's efforts to rebuild war-torn Afghanistan, and with offensive action against coalition strong points, they would sever the lifeline into Afghanistan from the west. Based on the success of these attacks, the enemy believed that the coalition's contributing nations would be pressured by internal dissent to reexamine their participation in supporting a new Afghanistan.

Enemy Disposition: the GUA Template

Enemy Intent: the Worse Case

- Disrupt the establishment of a central government, (subvert the central government's authority).
- Counter efforts to improve the country's infrastructure (attacks on the road projects).
- Re-isolate Afghanistan from the world community (targeting international and nongovernmental organizations).
- Subvert provincial and district governments through the infiltration of key government positions by individuals sympathetic to anti-coalition forces (shadow governments).
- Allow the pastoral people of Afghanistan to retain their normalcy of a mountain, agrarian society, undisturbed by modern encroachment.

Find the enemy. How? The essential question at the beginning and end of every day was, Where was the enemy? His intent was known, his disposition recognized, but his location required the application of the art of war.

The enemy order of battle consisted of the **guerrilla** (armed insurgent), the **underground** (political and financial arm of the insurgency), and the **auxiliary** (civilian support to the insurgency), otherwise known as the GUA. Depicting that information was a challenge, but it was portrayed in the "GUA template," wherein the estimated locations of each were portrayed on an overlay of the current battlefield area of operations.

Forces Available

Forces operating in Afghanistan operated as a combined, joint, and special operations team. During the 2004 COIN campaign there were various forces committed to the effort:

- a. Conventional ground (e.g., infantry, artillery, engineers, and military police)
- b. Support (e.g., supply, civil affairs, and transportation)
- c. Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft (including strategic and tactical bombers, close air support aircraft, cargo transport aircraft, utility and attack helicopters)
- d. Combined or coalition (a dozen countries participated in the CJTF, Combined Forces Command, and the NATO International Security Assistance Force organization)
- e. Afghan National Army units, Afghan National Police, and Afghan Border Police
- f. Joint forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines)
- g. Special operations (SF, SEALs, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations personnel).

The COIN Strategy

In actuality, to fight and win in Afghanistan was more than a plan of execution. It was more of understanding how to conduct COIN operations in a holistic campaign. The winning formula involved strike operations to kill or capture the insurgent and civic actions to remove the causes of instability that fostered the insurgency. The exit strategy was centered on Afghans defending Afghanistan.

Of course, it may appear to be simpler said or written, rather than done, but the strategy was succinct. Ending the war in Afghanistan only would come as Combined Forces concentrated military power to force the defeat of the insurgency and transition responsibility for the security of the country to the Government of Afghanistan. Securing the peace would come with international and interagency efforts to unify the hope of millions of Afghans for a better tomorrow.

Additionally, the external support that fueled the insurgency had to be suppressed. Hence the assessment was that the greatest threat to victory in Afghanistan was Al Qaeda; destroying them became the

first and foremost military objective during the 2004 COIN campaign, and that was done by defeating the Taliban.

To achieve success, we focused on three strategic goals for the campaign, which we called “lines of operation.” These lines focused our efforts to protect the populace and coalition, engage the underground, and prevent the auxiliary from supporting the insurgency:

- a. Voter registration and elections security—prevent the disruptions to the electoral process.
- b. Reconstruction—build Afghan institutions in order to remove the causes of instability.
- c. COIN operations—conduct UW and foreign internal defense to separate the guerrilla from the populace.

Campaign Objectives

In support of the broadly delineated goals, or lines of operation, subordinate objectives were put into play:

- a. Disrupt Taliban and HiG re-emergence and deny Al Qaeda external influence.
- b. Expand the span of control of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and as applicable Ministry of the Interior forces.
- c. Provide discreet mutual support to the international and host nation political, economic, and informational efforts.
- d. Remove causes of instability through civic action with an economic and educational focus.
- e. Employ a self-sustaining Afghan security infrastructure.
- f. Foster Afghan/Pakistan border security cooperation.

To achieve these objectives the CJSOTF-A applied the following concepts:

- a. Dominate the battlespace. The SF Operational Detachment-A, the infantry platoon, and the Afghan National Army company became the units of action in the COIN campaign and conducted area development to master their assigned joint special operations areas. Once mastered, find, fix, and finish operations targeted enemy forces.
- b. Synchronize military successes with diplomatic, economic, and informational elements of national power. Military commanders balanced strike operations to kill/capture the enemy



Figure 12. Strategy meeting: Operational Detachment-A working by, with, and through others, 26 September 2004.

with civic action to remove the causes of instability. The five primary causes of instability were (and are) lack of security; lack of structured national, provincial, and district governments; lack of infrastructure; widespread illiteracy; and illegal commerce. Commanders fostered relations with tribal elders, company level military leaders, and international/relief organizations' efforts to work quality of life efforts for the Afghan people.

- c. Foster a national identity and unity. Applying the basic tenets of "good governance," SOF conducted shuras (tribal or village councils) to instill with tribal leaders the essentials of governing. What does it mean to be a nation of many? How does a pluralistic society work? What is our national symbol?
- d. Transition the military mission. To achieve this objective, the CJSOTF-A embarked on a fundamental shift in combat operations toward systematically dismembering the insurgency; and a step-by-step process to destroy the underground, annihilate the guerrilla, and force the auxiliary to abandon the insurgency. The force utilized was a joint and company

team applying predominantly U.S. and coalition forces first to establish a “white area,” then transition the security responsibility for that area to indigenous security forces. Coalition forces were then able to transition to the next area, and continue on—one valley at a time.

The Battles for Afghanistan

The 2004 Afghan COIN campaign was orchestrated as a supporting plan to the overall CJTF 76, the higher headquarters of the CJSOTF-A. Five named operations were conducted with most of the effort oriented all the way down to the SF Operational Detachment-A. These were a series of major operations conducted across Afghanistan employing small units in large areas of operation:

- a. Operation Princess, the battle of Baghran Valley
- b. Operation Independence, the battle for freedom of information
- c. Operation Ticonderoga, the battle for Afghan independence
- d. Operation Trenton, the battle to secure the Afghan election
- e. Operation Saratoga, the battle to secure the border.

What follows is a brief description of these events.

Operation Princess. On 15 February 2004, coalition SOF commenced a deliberate special reconnaissance mission of central Afghanistan. Configured into an eight ground mobility vehicle formation, the coalition force departed from staging bases in Bagram and Kandahar and swept through the Oruzugan, Bahgran, and Arjestan Valleys. Additionally, the coalition force traversed the Day Kindi and Gizab areas. The mission was to prove enemy concentrations and transit corridors.

By mid-June 2004, the news was in. The coalition force had discovered enemy concentrations throughout the Baghran Valley. Enemy transit corridors ran through the Oruzugan Valley and in the Tarin Kowt bowl, ending in the Baghran Valley. The enemy organization in the area was established with guerrilla operations and underground activities ongoing since the Soviet War. The enemy was seasoned veterans, illusive and intermixed with the population. However, the reality was that the enemy was vulnerable.

Mission orders were simple: conduct strike operations to kill or capture the enemy leadership in the Baghran Valley. Interestingly

enough, we found repeatedly during the Afghan campaign that the best intelligence and the most effective operations were developed from the tactical units themselves. This observation is a very key point in conducting COIN operations—COIN is bottoms up, not top driven. Oddly enough, in our military system, plans and orders are developed at the higher echelon and delivered to the executing unit. The difference in Afghanistan was that subordinate commands developed and proposed operations to the CJTF headquarters and once approved by the commanding general, the approved concept of operations were executed. This was the case for Operation Princess, and in fact the other operations during the campaign. The concept of operations came from the executing unit, which was received by the J5, codified into an overall operations plan, then published as an operations order back to the executing command once the CJSOTF-A commander approved the plan.



Figure 13. Soldier from Afghan Security Forces on patrol in Nuristan, Afghanistan, 10 May 2004.

On 28 June 2004, Operation Princess was on. Prior to dawn, two simultaneous strike operations occurred, distanced by 100 plus kilometers to find the Baghran Valley area commander and his second in command. In a classic ground assault, the northern objective was

seized by the coalition assault force and follow-on exploitation operations revealed the identity of the area commander.²⁰

In the south, four Chinook helicopters dropped off another assault force who conducted a perfect encirclement of the southern objective. Landing at the main points of the compass, the assault force disembarked the aircraft and encircled the enemy's compound. In the ensuing cordon and search, the second in command was captured, and based on the information discovered in the assault on the northern objective, the area commander was also captured.

The results were that the enemy area commander and his second in command, the underground leaders in the heart of the Taliban's main operating base, were placed under coalition control. This area command, which had been in existence since the Soviet era, was eliminated within 4 hours, never to surface again. The Taliban leaders were identified as Abdul Hafiz Mageed and Mohammed Dawood. They were involved in supplying arms, conducting ambushes, disrupting nongovernment organizations' aid efforts, and running opium networks.

The next day, an adjacent unit action involved a sweep with about 2,000 coalition and Afghan National Army forces in a two-pronged converging movement to contact. The enemy early warning networks signaled the alarm, and the enemy forces took cover as the large force swept the area. The results were the recovery of two AK-47 assault rifles and one Enfield rifle. The basic point is that small unit action works in a COIN, where battalion movements do not.

The capture of Mageed and Dawood was released by the Public Affairs Office of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan to the media. The capture was retorted by the Taliban spokesman in exile in Pakistan, who claimed that though the two individuals were Taliban, they were in Pakistan and could not have been captured by the Americans. We knew differently of course, but now it was confirmed.

Operation Independence.²¹ To exploit the success of Operation Princess, a follow-on operation was executed; the objective of Independence was to build on the success achieved during Princess in the vicinity of Musa Qaleh and Baghran Valley on 1 July 2004. Two SF operational detachments were to move on the east and west sides of the Baghran Valley to find, fix, and finish any guerrilla pockets

(strike operation). There was also a second part of the operation, which was to emplace an exploitation package (civic action).²²

The first part of the operation, a pursuit, ended slightly different than envisioned. Instead of searching for guerrilla forces, a villager approached one of the SF teams and brought them to a cache. The contents of the cache took 3 days to process, to include the destruction of the ammunition that was not useful and hauling off the arms and ammunition that could be recovered. What had occurred was that a local, who had heard of the capture of the area commander, divulged the location of one of the Taliban's main ammunition storage points.

Cache recovery:

- 4 ZSU 23s
- 2 105-mm howitzers
- 2 T-62 tanks
- 12 cases of T-62 tank rounds
- 75,000 DShK rounds
- 210 30-mm rounds
- 300 82-mm mortar rounds
- 500 23-mm rounds
- 1,338 107-mm rockets
- 250 82-mm recoilless rifle HE rounds
- 200 82-mm mortar rounds
- 5 120-mm mortar rounds
- 1,750 cans 82-mm mortar rounds
- 631 cans 23-mm ZSU rounds
- 1,407 cans 12.7 DShK ammo
- 30,000 rounds of loose 12.7- and 23-mm ammunition

The second part of the operation consisted of exploiting the capture of the two Taliban leaders by continuing to provide security while delivering humanitarian assistance supplies from SOF MC-130 Talon aircraft. Coalition soldiers gathered school supplies, water, Afghan flags and flag tickers, and radios and dropped them to the Afghan people. The airdrop provided over 500 hand-cranked radios to keep the local people informed about news items, especially the local elections that were forthcoming.²³

Operation Ticonderoga. This operation was the CJSOTF-A main effort for the second half of 2004. This one broke the Taliban's back, severely degraded the enemy's ability to supply itself, and removed a large group of Taliban and Al Qaeda guerrillas from the field.

The naming of the operation took some care. After looking at some of the historic parallels, Ticonderoga was selected. *Ticonderoga* is derived from the Iroquois word for *between two waters*, adopted

to epitomize the CJSOTF-A's effort to separate the people of Afghanistan striving for their independence from terror and the enemies of Afghanistan who are pressing to perpetuate terrorism. The name also impresses the historic connotation to Fort Ticonderoga, which was a strong point separating the warring French and British armies and their indigenous/provincial allies during the French and Indian War, as well as between the English, and American armies during the American war of independence.

The concept of operations supported coalition goals to enable the voter registration and the election process, as well as support reconstruction. To do so required a shift in the conduct of special operations in Afghanistan, a reordering of the alignment of forces, a decisive move against the enemy, and a refocus of special operations in three areas:

- a. Eastern region to separate the guerrilla from the populace and secure the auxiliary from supplying the insurgency
- b. Southeastern region to deny/degrade the guerrilla sanctuary by conducting aggressive counter guerrilla operations to impede cross border movement and kill the guerrillas where they were found
- c. Southern region to disrupt the underground from conducting political and financial activities by occupying the battlespace and supporting a combined arms action against the Taliban.

The HiG was the predominant enemy force in the eastern region of Afghanistan. Under the leadership of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the HiG threatened stability in the Konar, Nuristan, and Kabul River Valley and was assessed to be the main insurgent threat to the elections process in the eastern part of the country. From their bases in the northeast, the HiG was capable of launching attacks against Kabul and Jalalabad (largest and second largest cities in Afghanistan), which would severely degrade the elections process. A viable combat force, the HiG, supported by Al Qaeda and the Taliban, appeared to be the route security force of the main enemy line of communications into Afghanistan.

Insurgent component:	The auxiliary
Component location:	Eastern Afghanistan
COIN strategy:	Secure from supplying
Enemy affected:	HiG (lead)/Taliban (support)
Results achieved:	Supplies degraded

To understand the core of the strategy to conduct special operations in the eastern region, a historic parallel was made. In summary, anything that goes through Afghanistan goes through the Khyber Pass. To get to the Khyber Pass, the old Silk Road (actually the Pepper Route) is followed from Kabul to Jalalabad and onward to Peshawar. Alexander the Great traveled this passage; it was the main land route for Britain, connecting Europe to the East, in fact dubbing the Khyber Pass as the gateway to Europe; and the Americans used this area to infiltrate arms, ammunition, and supplies in support of the Afghan freedom fighters during the Soviet war. Sixty percent of all commerce between Afghanistan and Pakistan came (and comes) through the Khyber Pass along Route 1 (the Pepper Route) and into Afghanistan.²⁴ Hence the epicenter for the auxiliary's logistics support to the Afghan insurgency came through the Khyber Pass and Route 1. By degrading and denying enemy logistic activities along Route 1, the insurgent's umbilical cord would be cut or withered. In the summer of 2004 an SF base camp was placed along Route 1, 2.2 kilometers from the Khyber Pass. The mission was to degrade, destroy, and impede enemy supply activities along Afghanistan's "Ho Chi Minh" trail. They did, and the enemy choked.

The assessment for the southeastern region of Afghanistan was that the guerrillas were using the Khowst area to trans-

Insurgent component:	The guerrilla
Component location:	Southeastern Afghanistan
COIN strategy:	Clear—kill/capture
Enemy affected:	Al Qaeda/Taliban
Results achieved:	Movement degraded

it into Afghanistan. There were other points along the border that ratlines were rampant, and these areas were the focus of special operations. The strategy for the southeastern region was to kill or capture the guerrilla. More so, the kill part, because unlike enemies of past, this enemy had no drive to negotiate with the coalition. Their job was to kill as many Americans as they could, and their reward was eternal happiness.

A series of SF base camps were placed along the border. Their presence was a magnet for guerrilla action. The base camps were reinforced with direct and indirect fires as well as air support. The CJTF 76 moved 105-mm howitzers in direct support of SF, later flying in 155-mm howitzers. The range fans on both systems were expansive, the firepower highly lethal. When enemy forces were spot-

ted, fire missions leveled them. When enemy rocket attacks were launched, so did A-10s. When ground assaults were attempted by Taliban and Al Qaeda, they were repulsed by SF, Afghan Security Forces, infantry, and mortar men.

This activity went on for months and only wore down the enemy. Hence, over a 12-month period, through a series of attacks and counterattacks, the guerrilla force attempts to transit the southeastern region of Afghanistan to strike targets in Kabul and Kandahar failed.

In the south, the Taliban was the problem. The former government of Afghanistan, who yielded great power and had a very succinct support base in Paki-

Insurgent component:	The underground
Component location:	Southern Afghanistan
COIN strategy:	Occupy
Enemy affected:	Taliban
Results achieved:	People turned against Taliban

stan and a tribal base amongst the Pashtu, were in hiding and conducting subversive activities to try to dislodge the growing democratic government. The Taliban's strategy was to undermine the election by terrorizing the people, scaring off international and nongovernmental organizations, attacking coalition bases, and supporting Al Qaeda and HiG anti-government activities. The Taliban was based predominantly west and northwest of Kandahar and had overt and covert followers. The Taliban occupied about a sixth of Afghanistan and was a very viable and determined threat.

There were three ways whereby the Taliban were defeated. First, in order to break the stronghold occupation that the Al Qaeda had on the south, the strategy became to occupy the occupied. By being among the Taliban and constantly on the offensive, the Taliban and the underground had to stay low or be exposed to being killed or captured. Operation Princess had destroyed the Taliban's capability in a large portion of their area. Subsequent operations by the SF forward operating base and base camps in the south constantly pressured the Taliban into force-on-force actions or to remain in hiding. As the Taliban hid, it enabled the democracy to grow.

Another aspect of special operations in the south consisted of a series of strike operations, and in one of these a powerful Taliban commander in the southern region was killed by a Navy SEAL team as he tried to escape a cordoned village. The Taliban leader, Rozi

Khan, had been recruiting Taliban fighters from Pakistan and financing Al Qaeda activities. A search of his body revealed \$10,000 (U.S.) and a large number of Pakistani rupees. The action placed Khan out of action and crippled Taliban operations in the south.²⁵

The results of Operation Ticonderoga were securing the auxiliary from providing logistics support to the insurgency. Guerrillas were cleared from the battlespace and could not make it to launching points in Afghanistan because they were reduced as they attempted to transit the border regions, and the underground was occupied and forced to stay underground.

The end result of Operation Ticonderoga was to separate the guerrillas from the people, so the people could vote, and they did on 9 October 2004, the first time in the 5,000-year-old history of the country.

Operation Trenton. Named with reference to General Washington's surprise attacks against the Hessians at Trenton, Operation Trenton was a series of spoiling attacks to attack the enemy before he attacked the elections of 9 October 2004. Operation Trenton supported an Afghan government security concept for three successive security rings around voting stations. The Afghan National Police patrolled areas up to 500 meters from polling places providing local security; the Afghan National Army provided security in a wider circle around the police. CJSOTF-A working with various tribal forces and other coalition forces conducted aggressive regional operations to disrupt enemy activities before they could impact the elections.²⁶

Employing the fundamental principle of counter guerrilla operations, the CJSOTF-A conducted a series of JTBs, identified the enemy sanctuaries, estimated their timeline to attack the major population




Figure 14. Ballots printed and ready to vote, 6 October 2004.

centers, and placed forces in motion to destroy enemy concentrations. The results were as follows:

- a. Planned enemy attacks in eastern Afghanistan were stopped.
- b. Enemy infiltration in the southeast was severely disrupted.
- c. Guerrilla operations in south were disrupted, including Rozi Khan's death; and a number of mid-level guerrillas actively operating in Zabol province were killed or captured. Planned enemy attacks against voting sites in the south were stopped. Nine SF base camps were placed on alert to respond to any enemy attack or intelligence indicating an attack. Four additional base camps conducted active patrolling along known enemy lines of communications.

At the SF base camp in Deh Rawood, a U.S. Army captain and his SF Operational Detachment-A and the rest of the SF base came under attack by a 200 plus contingent of Taliban. The Deh Rawood base camp had always been a focus of Taliban operations, due to its dominance in the Oruzugan Valley. On the day before the election, and in the early morning hours, the 200 Taliban force commenced an onslaught on the base camp to overwhelm the U.S. force. Using a mixture of air support and the Detachment-A firepower, approximately 70 Taliban were killed. The enemy attack was defeated, and the election progressed in this area that was formerly ruled by the Taliban.

Meanwhile, across Afghanistan, two other engagements occurred. Enemy fighters were detected attempting to rocket SF positions along the border with Pakistan and were engaged with 155-mm fire, killing approximately 100 enemy dead. A group of 20 guerrillas, who crossed from Pakistan into Afghanistan to link up with the killed guerrilla leader Rozi Khan, turned back towards Pakistan after local villagers told them of Khan's death. As they retreated along their communications line, an SF team discovered them, conducted a pursuit operation, and with close combat attack aircraft, mowed them down.

Though seemingly an impressive number of enemy killed in action were recorded in the days prior to the election, the number was never a measurement of effectiveness or an indicator of the success of special operations, but rather a metric of war that has little meaning. What is meaningful was that the election was held; only a

handful of enemy attacks were attempted with approximately 160 planned attacks preempted.

The epitome of the enemy defeat was disclosed in a combat patrol report from the Jalalabad patrol that witnessed truck after truck of fighting-age men with rice, cooking oil, and other supplies, heading along the old Kabul to Jalalabad road, to Tora Bora. The guerrillas were heading for the mountains.

Operation Saratoga. Internal legitimacy, external recognition, and legitimate borders are the three elements that define a nation. In the summer of 2001, Afghanistan had none of these. By the fall of 2004, all three had been obtained. One of the CJSOTF-A contributions was to help legitimize the troubled and highly disputed Afghanistan and Pakistan border. The operation conducted to address border security was Operation Saratoga.²⁷ Like Operation Trenton, Saratoga was a component of Ticonderoga, which involved reordering coalition forces along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border in order to improve unity of effort, command and control, and capability to deny enemy freedom of movement.

Commencing in September 2003, the CJSOTF-A commander and his SF battalion commanders conducted a series of face-to-face meetings between Pakistan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior officials responsible for sectors along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border, accompanied by local and national Afghan leaders. The purpose of these meetings was to start the long and deliberate process to codify the border and place responsibility for the management of the border with the appropriate authority. Up to this time, the border had been a point of friction and conflict between the two governments, complicating the ability of coalition forces to reduce or destroy the external source of support that was propelling the insurgency.

Border meetings from the Chitral District all the way down to Skhin became routine, allowing for Pakistan and Afghanistan officials to determine how they would work locally to stem the insurgency. In March of 2005, as the success of the CJSOTF-A produced tactical success, the deputy commanding general of the CJTF 76 entered the process to move to the next level of operational and strategic success. The border meetings continued, but with the deputy commanding general. His active participation also brought in the



Figure 15. Afghan, Pakistani, and U.S. civil and military leaders conclude a tripartite meeting at Torkham Gate, Afghanistan, 8 April 2004.

emerging government of Afghanistan, which achieved the results desired: a recognized government of Afghanistan involved in cohesive conversations with the Government of Pakistan in recognizing and respecting the border. The means to do so was by military discussions on interdicting guerrilla cross border movement.

Operation Saratoga had great political-military success at the operational level, while the SF battalion responsible for the border mission had success in the tactical mission. The critical aspect of Operation Saratoga became the availability of forces. In a number of ways, the CJTF 76 and the CJSOTF-A attempted to improve the border mission. At first, Afghan Security Forces augmented existing SF operating along the border by protecting the SF base camps, freeing up the coalition force to conduct operations. Next, the CJSOTF-A presented a series of plans to train, organize, and equip a border force, unilaterally or with the Government of Afghanistan and the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan assistance, which the CJSOTF-A was to combat advise. Resourcing issues halted the full implementation of an effective Afghan border force. The CJTF 76

worked to reallocate Afghan Border Police to the CJSOTF-A for Operation Saratoga; however, that force was redirected to other security missions. Finally, a requirement for Afghan National Army battalions was put forward, but by December 2004, not filled.

By December 2004, the Operation Saratoga results were as follows:

- a. Enemy infiltration along Afghan-Pakistan border curtailed due to the relocation of four SF base camps along the border, creation of six border checkpoints, and the refocusing of half of the CJSOTF-A combat power to the border mission.
- b. Cooperation between the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan increased face-to-face cooperation and the establishment of the Tripartite Commission on border matters.
- c. Introduction of Afghan Ministry participation provided the first step in solidifying government of Afghanistan control of its border, replacing warlord dominance.
- d. Direct communications at the checkpoint, sector, regional, and national levels (accomplished by a CJTF 76) installed a communications backbone.²⁸

It is easy to focus on combat operations, but our strategic objectives were two-fold: establishing security while helping the nation and its people. The next section discusses the nature of the planning and operations for civil-military COIN operations.

Figure 16.
Operational
Detachment-A
on patrol in
Afghanistan,
26 September 2004.



7. Civil-Military Operations (CMO) in COIN

During the 2004 COIN campaign in Afghanistan, the CJSOTF-A employed approximately 50 Civil Affairs specialists who executed approximately \$2 million in conditional CMO, encompassing scores of high impact projects from school renovations; medical, dental, and veterinarian assistance projects; economic impact programs; shuras; and road repair.

An example of a combination conditional CMO project involved the widows of Geresk and Operation Betsy Ross. In Afghanistan, the symbol of a person's loyalty or allegiance was the flag. In complexes across the country, flags that indicate a family's affiliation are flown. During the Taliban era, the black flag flew as a symbol of the people's loyalty to the Taliban. Flying over Afghanistan in November 2003, one could find a sea of black flags.

In Geresk during the war, several wives were widowed when their husbands were executed by the Taliban. In the weeks leading up to Operation Independence at the end of June/4 July 2005, the Civil Affairs company (special operations units) assigned to the command worked with this small group of widows from the town of Geresk and bought them sewing machines. During Operation Betsy Ross, the widows of Geresk formed a sewing factory and produced the tri-color flags of Afghanistan. Operation Betsy Ross expanded to the city of Asadabad in the north and production continued. The flags were bought and distributed across southern and northeast Afghanistan and began to replace the black flags of the Taliban. In September 2004, as one flew through the Kabul and Konar River valleys, what was seen were the red, green, and black tri-color flags with the seal of Afghanistan in the middle. The result was not only a symbol of loyalty to the new nation/national unity and of declining Taliban and HiG rule but also a measurement of the effectiveness of civil affairs in COIN operations.

Army FM 41-10 states that Civil Affairs activities are performed or supported by Civil Affairs forces that embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present and involve the application of Civil Affairs func-

tional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance the conduct of CMO.

The field manual also states that CMO are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military

operations and consolidate and achieve U.S. objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur before, during, or after other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. CMO may be performed by designated Civil Affairs forces, by other military forces, or by a combination of Civil Affairs forces and other forces.




Figure 17. Getting the ballots out for the October 2004 presidential election.

The conduct of Civil Affairs activities is dependent upon the level of war:

- a. In a high- or mid-intensity conflict, Civil Affairs operations consist of civil affairs activities involving nation assistance, usually specialized advice and support to foreign nation officials, and CMO involving support for combat operations by

minimizing civilian interference and mobilizing human and natural resources for combat support.

- b. In a low-intensity conflict, especially in a COIN campaign or operation, Civil Affairs operations consist of *conditional* CMO that entails military assistance to the populace to build and sustain civil cooperation and *focused* CMO involving military assistance to the populace to remove or reduce the causes of instability that support the insurgency.

CMO are focused on the civil side of the COIN campaign. The strategy is tailored against the enemy's order of battle—the guerrilla, insurgency, and auxiliary. The overarching construct of CMO is to separate the guerrilla from the populace (turn the populace against him and clear the guerrilla), occupy and reduce the underground (the democratic process), and employ the auxiliary (reconstruction projects). To support this focus, CMO are centrally planned with decentralized execution. Specifically, CMO concept of operations will focus on these actions:

- a. Identify the causes of instability, which promulgate the insurgency and high impact and/or sustainable plans to counter it (focused CMO).
- b. Develop protection plans for the local population (curfews, local security force support, neighborhood watch, and protected zones) and organize strategies to turn hostile locals friendly (black to white), neutral populations to supportive (gray to white), and retain positive support (conditional CMO).

Additionally, CMO must develop an executable plan of action to reconcile lower level guerrillas and separate the foot soldier from the insurgent's leadership.

The CJSOTF-A had a Civil Affairs company (special operations) assigned to the command. The company consisted of one Civil Affairs Team (CAT)-B (company headquarters) and five CAT-As. The B team established a CMO center to accomplish these tasks:

- a. Act as an operations center serving as the primary interface between the CJSOTF-A, local population, and organizations conducting humanitarian assistance within the joint special operations area. The primary effort was to document, track, and report resources provided for humanitarian assistance.



Figure 18. Establishing stability: U.S. officers meet with Afghan officials prior to an Afghan-Pakistani border security meeting in Chitral Province, Pakistan, 18 May 2004.

- b. Nominate CMO projects and monitor the level of progress towards completion.
- c. Establish and maintain a central CMO database for the CJSOTF-A.
- d. Measure CMO effectiveness in rejection of enemy activity by the populace. Increase government capabilities at the district level independent of coalition support. The populace presents problems to district leaders, not to coalition forces. The population influenced by CMO activities provides unsolicited information to coalition forces.
- e. Synchronize and deconflict CMO operations across the joint special operations areas and provide direct support as required.
- f. Support the CJSOTF-A in providing information on the sense of the populace towards the coalition and host nation government, progress of CMO projects, and other reportable data received at the CMO center.

The CAT-A provided direct CMO support to the battalions as follows:

- a. Coordinate CMO projects and Commander Emergency Report Program (CERP) project nomination, funding, and execution.
- b. Maintain a database of CMO projects conducted and their associated contractors and funding provided; also maintain projects still in proposal with estimate costs and keep the CAT-B informed of these projects.
- c. Conduct CMO that transitions to military civic action.
- d. Establish an environment conducive to operations and set conditions for long-term stability in sector.

Typically throughout the campaign across Afghanistan, the CATs were tasked to conduct the kinds of activities shown in the next table, which summarize the nature of their employment.

Activity	Description and Purpose
CERP	Conditional CMO to support those districts/population sectors who divulge insurgent location and disposition. Purpose is to exploit insurgent leadership and fighter's vulnerabilities.
Reconstruction project nomination	Focused CMO to remove or reduce causes of instability. Purpose is to reduce the insurgency.
Neighborhood watches	Self secure at the district/community level with coalition forces responding as a 911 force. Purpose is to deny sanctuary and make the insurgent vulnerable to interdiction.
Military civic action	Local and national government as well as coalition and international organizations work together to elevate the standard of living, offering a better future affecting strategic, operational, and tactical centers of gravity. Purpose is to reduce local support to the insurgency.
Democratic process	Secure the political process towards democracy, which defeats the underground's political influence of the population. Purpose is to turn the populace against the underground.
Reconciliation program	Allow the foot soldier to lay down his arms and stay with his family. Reconciled fighters register with local police and coalition forces/violators prosecuted. Purpose is to neutralize the guerrilla.

The combat operations in Afghanistan to find, fix, and finish the enemy were conducted primarily to establish a modicum of security for internal defense and development activities to flourish. The CATs operated at the very heart of our strategy, seeking to remove the causes of instability and help to establish a viable Afghan government down to the local level. The next section will take a look at the results of the campaign and offer some lessons learned.

8. Results Achieved, Key Lessons Learned, and the Next Level

A COIN campaign is a marathon. Unfortunately, there is no magic dust that can be sprinkled on an insurgency to defeat it. Commands conducting COIN operations must avoid treating their role in the campaign as just another rotation through a combat training center. That would only perpetuate the campaign, allowing the enemy enough time and space to regenerate from any defeat or loss that previous commands may have inflicted.

If the enemy is allowed to regenerate, it has the ability to defeat the U.S.; for inevitably, he will get through the homeland defenses with another catastrophic terrorist attack, attrit the American people's will and support for the COIN, and open other fronts of resistance to continue to purge the East of the West. It is evident that Al Qaeda has studied America's near defeat in Vietnam and is applying some of those defeat strategies to the U.S. The stakes are high in the global war.

Since a COIN campaign can be protracted, the command must focus on bringing their time in the fight to the next level, which means that the command must produce results. The results that the CJSOTF-A achieved were in support of the CJTF 76 who succeeded as follows:

- a. Helped liberate the oppressed so that the first election since the fall of the Taliban was held.
- b. Supported voter registration and the presidential election—10.2 million people registered, 90 percent voted (of which 35 percent were women).
- c. Attacked the enemy so that it was unable to affect the election; scores of attacks against the election were preempted.
- d. Fostered an environment whereby the local population was willing to give the coalition and Afghan forces information that lead to killing, capturing, or disrupting the enemy.
- e. Advised and mentored the Afghan National Army to achieve a higher level of combat competency and effectiveness.

Lessons Learned

Throughout the campaign a number of ideas came to the forefront as especially useful lessons learned for conducting a COIN campaign. Here are the key lessons learned:

- a. Define the enemy order of battle—for example, insurgency (guerrilla, auxiliary, and underground).
- b. Develop cohesive campaign plans, which are executable to defeat the enemy order of battle.
- c. Synchronize general purpose, special, and indigenous operations.
- d. Empower operations at the lowest levels.
- e. Ensure main effort is offensive operations—no backwards step in an insurgency.
- f. Focus on the center of gravity—the Afghan people.
- g. Fight the enemy, move to where the enemy is, gain contact, and maintain it.
- h. Focus CMO to remove the causes of instability and afford assistance on a conditional basis.
- i. Inform the people and keep them informed.
- j. Maintain focus on completing the defeat of the insurgency—that is, the guerrilla.
- k. Conduct pursuit operations to enhance the success of the assault and exploitation force.

The tenets of the COIN campaign listed above guided the CJSOTF-A through five major combat operations. About 1,500 combat patrols were conducted, supported by over 400 close air support missions. During the campaign, some 50 enemy leaders were captured or killed, and one third of the guerrilla force was killed or placed under coalition control. The gallant troops CJSOTF-A labored in close combat, earning numerous decorations: three Silver Stars, 28 Bronze Star Medal with V device for valor, 44 Army Commendation Medals with V device for valor, 524 Bronze Star Medals for meritorious service in combat, and 24 Purple Hearts.

Leadership Insights

Conducting a COIN campaign or operation is a thinking person's game that requires leadership, from the private to the general. The notion that the "enemy has a vote" implies that the U.S. military's dominance on the battlefield is not always effective against an insurgency. Insurgent elements can outmaneuver the U.S. military ability to manage the fight and place friendly forces in a reactionary mode.

Defeating an insurgency becomes more likely when the COIN force can enter into the insurgent's decision-making process. Once that is achieved, the road to the insurgent's defeat is cleared. However, to achieve that operational capability requires a leader that adapts his mindset and his unit to the insurgency environment and maximizes the strengths of all units in the fight. He molds the team all into one focused effort. CJSOTF-A experiences suggest that the successful leader was one who could direct as follows:

- a. Get all leaders out on the battlefield.
- b. Synchronize and deconflict CMO across the joint special operations areas and provide direct support as required.
- c. Go on the offense, move to the enemy, stay in the fight until the job is done.
- d. Focus on the basics—shoot, move, and communicate.
- e. Understand that the key leaders are the junior leaders.
- f. Think like the enemy.
- g. Evolve the COIN campaign as success is obtained.
- h. Define the enemy order of battle and systematically attack its components.
- i. Maintain focus on the people of Afghanistan.
- j. Flatten command and control structure and condense reporting requirements.
- k. Find the thoroughbreds in the force and let them run.
- l. Teach soldiers how to think, not what to think.
- m. Coordinate with diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power.
- n. Master cultural astuteness, then go beyond and master the human dimension of war.
- o. Stay ahead of the COIN as it constantly evolves.

- p. Integrate the military campaign with diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of power.
- q. Ask for the resources needed and operate within the resources available.
- r. Stay out of the papers and off the wire.
- s. Maintain a sense of humor.

Leaders must record what was done and learned and how it was done, then give that document to other COIN warriors so they will know how to fight and win against the guerrilla, the underground, and the auxiliary. In addition, effective leaders understand that warriors die in combat and that true warriors respect death, embrace the survivors, but are not subsumed by the horror of war. Leaders keep focused on the strategic objectives of the campaign and move combat to the next level.

Achieving Strategic Objectives—the Next Level

The next level means melding political, military, economic, and informational elements of national power to one focus. Up to this point in combat operations in Afghanistan, the military has been the leading element of national power. The 2004 COIN campaign largely defeated the insurgency. With the military securing Afghanistan, diplomacy and the political and economics elements of national power can assume the lead to assist the Afghan people with their future. The military will be able to lift and shift its efforts to pursue the enemy wherever they are. It is the Army's future to continue the fight in this global war on terrorism in other regions.

In Afghanistan, it is essential to continue a systematic progression from removing the terrorist base to providing a safe and secure environment so the people of Afghanistan can chart their own future. International organizations and contributing countries will assist the newly formed government of Afghanistan in overcoming security challenges, lack of governance, poor or no infrastructure, illiteracy, and the illegal commerce (especially the drug trade) that undermines economic progress.

There is a famous quote from Mao Zedong on how to conduct guerrilla warfare; he said: "the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea." The Russians tried to drain the

sea. The CJSOTF-A simply changed the temperature of the water to bring the fish to the surface and catch them in a net.

In December 2004 as the campaign concluded, the incumbent CJSOTF-A transferred authority from the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) to the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Its charge was to execute Operation Yorktown and bring combat operations in Afghanistan to the next level. ↑



Figure 19. Success came one valley at a time; here an Afghan irregular participates in offensive combat operations with coalition forces 13 May 2004.

Endnotes

1. Major General Eric T. Olson, U.S. Army, adopted the expression “One Team” as he commanded the CJTF 76.
2. In 1992 and 1996, fatwahs, an interpretation of Islamic law by a respected Islamic authority, were issued against American troops in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Again in 1992 to 1993, fatwahs were issued against American troops in Somalia and in the February 1998 fatwah, against American civilians.
3. The Grand Jury indictment, though published in November 1994, not only captures the history of Al Qaeda as an organization but delineates the reasons why it wars against the U.S. The indictment also contains an in-depth cataloging of Al Qaeda leaders, organizational constructs, and operational techniques. The information in the indictment is very relevant to today. Though not contained in quotes, the excerpt is a direct extract.
4. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Al Qaeda International,” testimony of J.T. Caruso (acting assistant director of Counter Terrorism Division) before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 18 December 2001; available from www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/caruso121801.html.
5. Central Intelligence Agency, “Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World,” statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), 7 February 2001; available from www.cia.gov/terrorism/pub_statements_terrorism.html.
6. Contributed by 1LT Tony Alvarez.
7. The preceding paragraphs were contributed by SGM George Johnson.
8. History demonstrates that no insurgency has ever been successful without external support.
9. Some details on Haqqani are from Sukumar Muralidharan, “America’s War, Into a Crucial Phase,” *Frontline* 18, 22 October to 9 November 2001.
10. Scott MacDonald, “Minister’s Visit Hints at Taliban Split,” Reuters (Islamabad), 20 October 2001. Also “Taliban Official in Talks Over New Leadership,” *The Orange County Register*, 21 October 2001; available from www.cursor.org/stories/jalaluddin.htm or www.hinduonnet.com/fine/fl1903/19030560.htm.
11. Robert Marquand, “The reclusive ruler who runs the Taliban,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 October 2001; available from www.csmonitor.com/2001/1010/p1s4-wosc.html.
12. Route goes from Baghdad northeast to Khanaqin on Iran’s border; over pass to Kermanshah, past Behistun to Hamadan, to Kazvan, then Tehran. Silk Route would usually go from Tehran, Chalus, Behshahr, Meshed, Herat. Bamian Valley is west northwest of Kabul, to Kabul.

The modern road cuts south at Herat to Farah, across Helman River to Kandahar on its south bank, Ghazni, Kabul. At Kabul the Silk Route heads northeast over Hindu Kush Mountains. Another route [Pepper Route] goes to Pakistan and India over Khyber Pass, eventually ending in Delhi. From Kabul the route also heads northeast into the Panjshir Valley; Kabul to Charjkar [Begram], and along the Panjshir River. It follows the narrow strip of Afghanistan, along the Oxus River to Sinkiang Province, China.

13. Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1964; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1985), 64-5.
14. The U.S. Joint Forces Command references to establishing a Joint Special Operations Task Force provided in-depth organizational expertise for codifying the CJSOTF-A's command and staff functions as referenced in this section 5.
15. Status of radio, computer networks, and Web page.
16. Use standard graphics to display major subordinate unit's combat power by major weapon system, personnel, logistics, and location.
17. Conditional and focused CMO missions, CERP status, and populace sensing.
18. Information Operations (IO) coordinates psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, computer network attack/defense, and electronic warfare.
19. The 2004 COIN campaign began the transition from a UW campaign commencing in September 2003. By 1 June 2004, the planning and repositioning of forces, as well as the change in CJTF commanders and headquarters, set the conditions for the most effective COIN campaign in the past 40 years, which was launched to defeat the insurgency and remove threats to a new Afghanistan.
20. At this point in the operation, the identity of the second in command had been known, and the base of the area commander determined.
21. Release No. 040715-01, date posted, 15 July 2004 by Sergeant Major Keith Butler, CJSOTF-A Public Affairs; available from www.soc.mil/news/releases/04JUL/040715-01.htm.
22. Operation Independence was named for two reasons: a) conducted on 4 July and b) illustrated the first step of many that the CJSOTF-A would take to assist the people of Afghanistan in achieving their independence from the tyranny of terrorism.
23. USASOC News Service, 15 July 2004; available from <http://news.soc.mil/releases/04jul/040715-01.htm>.
24. During America's support to the Mujihheddin, arms and ammunition were smuggled from bases in Peshawar and Parichinar across the mountains by mules. Mistakenly assessed to the case during the Afghan campaign, military planners were convinced that the enemy lines of communication followed past routes. In fact, over a 13-month period, only a handful of reports cited enemy supply activity being

transported by mule. The enemy simply was driving supplies in, hidden inside cargo shipments.

25. Lara Logan, CBS correspondent, reported this story for *60 Minutes*, © MMIV, CBS Worldwide Inc. All rights reserved. Logan spent 3.5 weeks in Afghanistan with the U.S. Navy SEALs, the first time a journalist has been allowed to go with them into combat. She followed them on the hunt for one of the most sought-after members of the Taliban.
26. Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: U.S., Afghan Officials Say Security Efforts Ensured Smooth Elections," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 12 October 2004; available from www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/10/2009b822-2110-4490-8941-2fadcde39606.html
27. Again, another revolutionary war theme referencing the colonial army's victory in defeating the British attempt to spilt the colonies and divide and conquer.
28. Headquarters United States Central Command, "Tripartite Commission 8th Meeting," News Release No. 04-09-60, Kabul and Islamabad, 18 September 2004. This commission was composed of senior military and diplomatic representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the U.S. They exchanged views on the security situation and mutual cooperation among the commission members.

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